The Study On Moral Hazard And Prevention Of Deposit Insurance System In China

Deposit insurance system is one of the three most important part of Financial Security Net,It has played an important role in maintaining stability of the financial system.Nowadays,Deposit Insurance System has been adopted by more and more countries to protect depositors' interests.However the deposit insurance system could bring moral hazard inevitably and seriously.We must take it seriously.If we can't effectively evade the risk of moral hazard,it will aggravate the instability of the financial system.China announced to implement the regulations from May 1,2015,entering the practical stage of deposit insurance system.Therefore,studying the causes of moral hazard of the deposit insurance system and finding the ways to prevent and control the moral hazard problem is important,it has important sense to maintain the stable development of the financial system.This article uses relevant expertise in finance,insurance,economics,etc.It uses the methods of game model,marginal cost analysis,comparative analysis and other research methods.Firstly,it describes the basic theory of moral hazard in the deposit insurance,and introduces specific content of moral hazard and notes that it may bring significant economic and social losses.Secondly,make a detailed description about the specific performance of moral hazard of the deposit insurance system from depositors,insured banks and deposit insurance agency.It analyzes the causes of moral hazard based on two perspectives of asymmetric information theory and marginal cost theory.Thirdly,it makes comparative analysis on the deposit insurance system in United States and Germany respectively,which points out the experience of the moral risk prevention.Finally,it gives some suggestions of preventing moral hazard from two sides,one is the system design,the other is the relevant environment construction.