| In recent years,as China’s economy has entered a new normal,"dish putting a quantity to use good increment alive" has become an economic prescription of senior policy makers.Commercial banks,as an important part of economic capital providers,have to adapt the new normal with bad debt rate rising and fulfill the needs of economic transformation and upgrading,which requires the release of its loan stock and improving the efficiency of resource allocation.In addition,there are many financial products on the market,with the good and bad intermingled,e.g." Ezubao",an online financing platform.Behind the frequent incidents of fraud and other platforms,that is the strong market demand for qualified financial products.It is in this context,the securitization of credit assets have been lifted and promotion.But the asset securitization involves a complex accounting judgments,particularly focusing whether "Sales" is reached,and whether the transferee needed to be merged.And it greatly limits the innovation of securitization in new varieties,and new modes.The traditional products is not economic,and it could not motivate the enthusiasm of commercial banks.In addition,in the retrospection of the US subprime mortgage crisis in 2007,the market tell us that in despite of a formal legal de-recognition of loan assets,people will blame the angry of loss on the bank due to the basic assets have ever marked with the label of bank.Therefore,I prefer to take the sell of securitization as an extension of involvement outside the balance sheet.And that demands continued monitor and disclosure of risks in order to provide early warnings.Currently,China have no clear detailed rules which are workable and compulsive,except fews of principled disclosure requirements.So when it comes to disclosure of the loan securitization,commercial banks get a large autonomous space,which would become a major hidden hazard in the leap-forward of loan securitization,and exacerbate information asymmetry.In that situation,investors could not understand the whole picture of the risk in s annual report of the bank,and that would influence their economic decision-making.Based on the above conclusions,this article attempts to sort out the relevant accounting standards,analyze the specific terms of the contract which would affect the off-balance sheet judgement,and figure out the evolution of off-balance sheet disclosure in underlying assets with the research of associated regulatory documents.Finally,I will build a set of evaluation system to regulate the disclosure of asset securitization business.That would be a useful exploration.This paper uses the research path of "Literature Review-Theoretical Analysis-Case Study Evaluation System Building." This article will take the path from the off-balance sheet judgement of the underlying assets to off-balance sheet disclosures.With the review on research in related fields,I will work out an overview of the theoretical basis in judging whether to take the underlying assets off the balance sheet.And then connect the relevant provisions which have been written in the transaction contracts with accounting theory to figure out how the provision works in the judgement.I will use Phase II of Zhongyin personal housing mortgage loan asset backed securities in 2015 as an case study.In the subsequent off-balance sheet disclosure study,we will review relevant domestic and international norms,regulations and documents,analysis shortcomings of China’s commercial banks in the annual reports,and make a study of international leading bank-JP Morgan Chase.With the interpretation of annual report of JP Morgan,I will build a scoring system in off-balance sheet disclosure of loan securitization,which would be a good reference in measuring off-balance sheet disclosure of loan securitization. |
