An Experimental Study On Self-selection Of Punishment System Under Incomplete Supervision

In recent years,experimental economics has gradually become a branch of economic research,and public goods game and punishment system has become a hot research field.In order to maintain the effectiveness of groups in the public goods game,people often take punitive measures to reduce the "free riders",thereby enhancing the level of cooperation in members.There are many kinds of punishment system.Many literatures focus on how to select an efficient system in public goods game.However,in reality,there is noise interference in the public goods game,such as judicial error.On the basis of these,this paper studies on the endogenous selection of informal punishment system and formal punishment system in the presence of incomplete information through experimental economics.The main conclusions of the experiment are as follows:(1)The cooperative behavior and income of the subjects under the two disciplines with incomplete supervision will decrease,and it will become more obvious in the informal punishment system;(2)Informal punishment system is more sensitive than formal system under incomplete information.In other words,incomplete information will increase the proportion of subjects who choose formal punishment system;(3)The subjects will become more merciful and the behavior of punishemnt will be reduced under the informal punishment system with incomplete supervision,and that confirmed the above two conclusions from the side.