Service Subsidies And The Stackelberg Game Study Of Supply Chains With Common Suppliers

Since the reform and opening up,China's market economy gradually develops,but there are also severe competition,companies take various measures to make their profits and the whole supply chain optimal in the face of a variety of competing.In the market economy,in addition to price,service is also an important factor to promote sales,the performance of the supply chain is not only affected by the price factor,but also affected by the level of service.The service subsidies have become a hot academic research.This paper summarizes the research based on the coordination of the supply chain scholars traditional channels and online retail channels and the traditional channels as well as providing services for the manufacturer or retailer,taking the serve subsidies into account,using game theory as the main tool,combined with service factor,building the subsidies game model in distribution channels analysising service compensation mechanism for the effect of the distribution channel management.The main contents and conclusions of the article are as follows:(1)This paper studies the two influence that the manufacture providing service subsidy policy or not has on the optimal price,the service decision and the profit of the parties in a supply chain composed of one retailer and one manufacturer in the Stackelberg game.It concludes that providing service subsidy always makes the retailer damaged.Only if the service subsidy coefficient satisfies certain conditions,can the manufacturer's profit and the system profit increase.The service subsidy coefficient for the optimal system profit is significantly lower than the service subsidy coefficient for the optimal manufacturer's profit.It concludes that if there is no suitable profit allocation mechanism,the retailer has no incentive to receive service subsidy.So this paper uses Nash bargaining model to allocate the extra profit which is brought by the service subsidy policy to increase the manufacturer's profit and the retailer's profit.(2)This paper studies the influence that service subsidy policy of the manufacture has on the optimal price,the service decision and the profit of the parties in a supply chain composed of two retailers and a common manufacturer.The results show tlhat with the increase of the service contribution coefficient,the wholesale price and retail price of the products increases,the level of service provided by the retailer decreases after the first increase;when the service contribution coefficient is certain,the manufacturer's profit?market demand,retailer's profit increases with the intensity of price competition among retailers coefficient increasing,the service level,the wholesale price and retail price increases with the intensity of price competition coefficient decreasing,when the service competition intensity factor is in a certain range and the service contribution coefficient is certain,the wholesale price,the market demand and service levels increases,while the retailer's profit increases with the service competition intensity factor increasing.Wholesale price,service level,retail price,market demand,the manufacturer's profit and system profit decreases with the service cost factor increasing,retailer's profit increases with the service cost factor increasing.