An Empirical Study Of The Equity Incentive And Corporate Performance Of The Listing Corporations

Under the modern enterprise governance,the separation of the ownership and management right of the company has been one of the hottest issues. There are two important ways to reduce agency costs, one is strengthen the supervision, the other is reasonable design of incentive contract. Equity incentive contract first appeared in 1930s of the United States and this long-term incentive mechanism had been first appeared in December 31,2005 of our country. Although a lot of articles had been studied of their relationships, but there are few articles discuss from the perspective of the company and also the perspective of the corporate governance. From this background, this paper studies among equity incentive and their performance in about company.In order to study the long-term incentive effects of equity incentive, this paper selects the listing corporation which implemented equity incentive in 2006-2014.At the same time we also eliminate the medium-term delisting or listed companies in order to avoid short-term impact. Based on perspective of equity incentive plan,we use empirical ways to learn different effects of the different incentive plan. According to the empirical results, this paper draws the following four conclusions:(1)The implementation of equity incentive companies operating better performance than non-implemented companies. This shows that the enthusiasm has increased in implementated companies and current stage of our listing corporations have played a good incentive effect. (2) The incentive effect of stock option is better than that of restricted stock, but the effect is not significant. According to this conclusion, this paper continues to analyze the reasons from the perspective of the company and the control of the large shareholders. (3) The incentive effect of stock option is more significant than that of the state-owned enterprises, and the incentive effect of stock option is better than that of restricted stock; (4) For state-owned enterprises, with the increase of the proportion of first largest shareholder, the incentive effect of restricted stock is enhanced and it will be significantly better than that of the stock option.Finally according to the empirical results of our research, there are other ways to enhance incentive effects in addition to traditional concept of increase incentive intensity and strengthen enterprises' supervision outside. There are also different incentive plans to adjust enterprise governance structure or depending on the nature of the enterprise, these measures are all ways to produced different effects. Only in this way can we conducive to further understanding of the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance.