Research On The Relationship Between Managerial Power And Cash Dividend Policy Of State-owned Enterprises

With the gradual development of state-owned enterprise's reform, and its income distribution is becoming more and more attention. On the third plenary session of the 18th Central Committee, has decided to turn over profits to the state-owned capital until 2020, increased to 30%, and the more revenue will be used to improve the livelihood of the people. But in the state-owned enterprises, because of information asymmetry and principal-agent chain is too long, makes management compared with investors with a more complete information superiority fully, the problem of "insider control", the management power increase accordingly. Under the condition of the compensation control of management, higher management power can't get higher remuneration; At the same time, the state-owned enterprises to carry out a half mandatory share out bonus, state-owned enterprise will drop its cash flow, management control benefits received influence, management began to use its own strong power, to seek more private gains, and produce the demotivation phenomena. In turn, management will impose effects on cash dividend policy by its strong power, weakening the effect of state-owned enterprise dividend policy.Therefore, in order to further explore the relationship between the management of power and state-owned enterprises cash dividend policy, according to the data of state-owned enterprises listed from 2007 to 2014, the paper establish of an empirical model that:(1) Reducing the control of the operators, by cash dividends of state-owned enterprises, will lead to state-owned enterprises operators expand on-the-job consumption, for compensating for the loss of personal gain. (2)In state-owned enterprise, the expansion of the cash dividend proportion will reduce control of the operators, which in turn makes the management incentive intensity decreases, affect the enthusiasm of management, reducing management's efforts. (3)Management power of state-owned enterprises and the level of cash dividends have a significantly negative correlation, namely the management power can reduce the level of cash dividend. (4)In state-owned enterprises, the quality of internal control can weaken the inhibitory effect of management power on cash dividend.In order to promote the implementation of the cash dividend policy of state-owned enterprises, according to the results of the empirical analysis, this paper puts forward the following suggestions:First, define the detailed the cash dividend proportion of state-owned enterprises; Second, improve the external supervision mechanism; Third, improve the system of state-owned enterprise information disclosure; Fourth, establish perfect internal governance mechanism; Fifth, improve the state-owned enterprises managers hiring and incentive mechanism.