Research On The Relationship Between Institutional Investors, Internal Control And Inefficient Investment

In recent decades, a large number of scholars at home and abroad confirms that there has a positively relationship between investment and economic growth by empirical research. The level of Investment efficiency directly affects the economic growth, and has become one of the most direct competition indicators of the economic strength contest via countries. At the 22 nd comprehensively deepen reform meeting general secretary Xi emphasis on deepening the reform of investment and financing system, to establish corporate investment main body status, to improve the enterprise investment management, pay attention to advanced policy guiding, afterwards regulatory constraints and service process, play a guide and magnified effect role of government investment, improve the efficiency of investment as a whole. Based on our country enterprise's widespread phenomenon of inefficient investment and the country attaches great importance to investment, this study focuses on how to increase the efficiency of investment, and improve the inefficiency of investment condition.This article took our country 2009-2013 Shanghai and Shenzhen' main board listed companies as the research object, based on the principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory, investigated the enterprises inefficiency investment governance effect of the two kinds of corporate governance mechanism about institutional investors holding and the internal control, and considering the differences influence of institutional investors and enterprise property rights. This paper mainly based on the following four questions: one is that how's the institutional investor shareholding play the role of governance inefficient investment; Secondly, how's the internal control play the role of governance inefficient investment; Thirdly, the institutional investors holding and the governance effect of the internal control will be affected by the enterprise's property right and the type of institutional investors or not. The fourth is the institutional investor shareholding and internal.Through the model design and empirical test, the study found that institutional investors holding and internal control, had a significant negative correlation relationship with the inefficiency of investment,and shows that institutional investors holding rising could strengthen the supervision of managers, thus inhibiting the inefficiency of investment; The promotion of the quality of internal control can implement a better internal supervision, ease the information asymmetry between the enterprise internal and external, make further effort to improve the investment efficiency of enterprises. Further grouping study found that compared with the state-owned enterprises, the institutional investors holding and internal control in the non-state-owned enterprises had a more significant inhibition with the inefficiency of the investment; Relative to the transactional institutional investors, stable institutional investors holding contributed to negative relationship between the institutional investors holding, internal control and inefficiency investment. To test the collaborative governance effect between institutional investor shareholding, internal control and the inefficiency investment of the enterprise, referred to the scholars' existing research methods, divided the internal control into high quality and low quality in case to doing the median and average differentiation inspection, at the same time did the grouping regression, the result shows that institutional investors holding, internal control and the inefficiency investment of the enterprise had a collaborative governance effect.This paper extends the governance mechanism of inefficient investment of enterprises, enrich the related literature, and to solve the problem of inefficient investment has important guidance and reference significance.