The Research Of Control Rights Contest Between Founders, Managers And Investors

In recent years, the problem of competing for control rights among China's private enterprise of the problem has become a hot issue. In China, when private enterprise is founded, the founders of enterprise control of the enterprise, manage and operate by their own. With the development of the enterprise, the enterprise demand for huge funds, so the founder solved the shortage of funds through foreign capital, the absorption of foreign investment and the change of ownership structure. Although the problem of shortage of funds was solved, the next problem was an improper corporate structure and complicated ownership structure. It will lead to introduce the managers, and the founder of enterprise risk of being weakened control. The critical failure of cooperation between Wahaha and Danone is the lack of in-depth research, neglecting of the details of the treaty. Therefore, in the decision-making process of capital cooperation strategy, the enterprise should be comprehensive, in-depth analysis of their own to do research work, the control of the core strategic resources, a reasonable choice of capital cooperation scheme. In the case of Gome, the key point is the agency problem of controlling shareholder and the management layer, the positive impact of the separation of the two powers are more conducive to the expansion of the scale of enterprises, strengthen the management of the professional level, but also had a negative impact. The reason lies in the mutual trust crisis of major shareholders and managers of business occupation. The separation of ownership and control rights results to the problem of transfer the control rights from the owner to t manager. How the owner supervise and restrict the manager and urge them to make decisions by achieving equity maximization, not breach of privilege, which is the fundamental problem of principal agent theory. Additionally, it also reflects the chaos of the power distribution of shareholders and board of directors. Therefore, seeking balance of the interests of operators, shareholder and company, improving the corporate governance is a key part of the power of board of directors and the general meeting of shareholders of the game, which also affects the operating efficiency of the company. Through the case of Alibaba and Yahoo, it needs to be objective and fair to come to conclusion on the aspect of the market economic investment, investment risk and investment rights and obligations. It will be helpful to rational processing events. Now in this thesis I classify the type of competing control rights of enterprise into the control of equity, the current control of company and the control of core assets or technology according the case of Wahaha, Gome and Alibaba. I analyze the essential problems behind three cases, and put forward some suggestions.