Study On The Corporate Governance Of Commercial Bank Under The Framework Of Basel ?

The global financial crisis was triggered by the U.S. subprime mortgage problems,the essence of which is a financial enterprise's corporat e governance crisis. Corporate governance problems such as lack of market regulation,executives credit deterioration, risk internal control failure, unreasonable incentive constraint mechanism, moral hazard and asymmetric information was shown in the financial crisis, to the world attention again. By summing up the lessons of the international financial crisis, the basel committee has revised the new capital accord, and announced the Basel capital accord ? in October 2010, new regulatory capital agreement put forward higher requirements in many aspects of commercial bank corporate governance. This paper analyzes the impact of Basel ? on corporate governance of commercial banks in China from the ownership structure, risk control mechanism, the board of directors and senior executives incentive constraint mechanism and information disclosure and so on.Selection the core index of commercial bank corporate governance from the Basel capital accord ?, Strengthen the principles of corporate governance of commercial bank and corporate governance guidelines of commercial banks, synthesized BSG index of corporate governance of commercial bank through standard normal method To comprehensive evaluation of commercial ba nk corporate governance. The results show that the index accords with the practice of our country banking industry, has the significance certain reality instruction.The Basel capital accord ? make the issuance of banking regulatory concept from micro-prudential supervision into coordinated macro-prudential regulation and micro prudential regulation. macro-prudential regulation and micro prudential regulation at the same time is a new challeng e for the banking industry in China, both the implementation of which have any impact on commercial bank corporate governance? There is a mismatch factor between the two? To solve these problems, in this paper, through the PVAR model empirical analysis macro-prudential regulation in China's banking industry and micro prudent supervision on the impact of corporate governance of commercial bank. Impulse response shock results reflect that macro and micro prudential supervision have incentive incompatibility f actors with bank corporate governance, macro-prudential and micro prudential supervision is not fully coordinated also. Our regulatory authorities should continue to improve the macro and micro prudential supervision tools on one hand, make macro-prudential and micro prudential supervision coordinated development; On the other hand, starting from concerned bank corporate governance, establishment of the bank's risk management and banking supervision hard constraints, improve the effectiveness of banking supervision.