Research On Privacy-preserving Auction For Single-sided Heterogeneous Spectrum Allocations

As is known to all,spectrum is a limited resource for wireless communication,and it is facing a shortage crisis.On the one hand,the traditional static spectrum allocation policy adopted by government has caused the utilization of idle spectrum channels reduced seriously.On the other hand,with the rapid development of wireless communication technology,it is bound to make the scarce spectrum resources get worse.In order to alleviate the shortage crisis,there emerges a secondary spectrum market,where the primary users can sell or lease their channels to the secondary users to receive proper payoff during their idle time.Recently,to improve spectrum utilization greatly,truthful spectrum auctions have been widely studied,and the privacy issues involved in these auctions have been widely concentrated well.However,existing work considered only homogeneous spectrum auctions,while heterogeneous spectrum auctions have almost no corresponding protection measures.In this dissertation,we give the security analysis for one single-sided heterogeneous spectrum auctions,TAMES.Specifically,in Bid Submission phase of TAMES,all buyers must be disclosed their true valuations to the auctioneer.However,whether the auctioneer is honest or not,valuations is very important for buyers and requires strict protection.In addition,in Winner Determination phase of TAMES,the lowest-bid buyer in each group will be the pricing buyer and be disclosed its bid in final auction outcome,which will reveal the buyer's ID.To achieve the security in the sense of cryptography,we proposed PATH,a privacy-preserving auction for single-sided heterogeneous spectrum allocations,which reveals nothing about buyers'sensitive information beyond the auction outcome to any participant party.In addition,we also proposed an improved design for single-sided heterogeneous spectrum allocations,namely improved PATH.Considering the spectrum heterogeneity in TAMES,which not only allows buyers to freely express their different preferences towards different channels,but the conflict graphs constructed between all channels will not be the same.Compared with a single bid in homogeneous spectrum auction,buyer's bid vector in heterogeneous spectrum auction will inevitably increase the computation and communication overheads caused by PATH in terms of heterogeneous bidding.To improve the efficiency and guarantee the security of basic PATH,we proposed a technique called data vector package(DVP)to deal with the challenge of buyer's heterogeneous bidding.The performance comparison and experimental simulations between basic PATH and improved PATH all proved that the improved design has high execution efficiency and is feasible for large-scale applications while strictly protecting the buyers' privacy information in TAMES.In a word,we mainly focused on the potential security threats in heterogeneous spectrum allocations,and proposed PATH,a privacy-preserving auction.In particular,the way of processing spectrum heterogeneity and buyer's heterogeneous bidding in PATH,provides support for the research on privacy protection of heterogeneous spectrum allocations in the future.