Can Hart’s Theory Of Legal Normativity Be Possible

This thesis tries to oppose one reading of Hart by the present popular legal positivism,and purport a Hartian theory which is correct from my view.I shall first distinguish two kinds of possibilities of Hartian theory,i.e.Existence Condition Theory and Analytic Theory.The former represents that what Hart attempted to do is to provide the existence condition theory for the social rules,and to reduce law to social facts like practice;the latter means that what Hart purposed is an explanation of law after the existence of the social rules.Combining the text of Hart and the criticisms of Hart’s theory,I will argue that the popular understanding by Existence Condition Theory establishes on the misunderstanding of Hart’s text,and the Existence Condition Theory cannot defend themselves from the challenges to Hartian theory by other theorists.Based on this analysis,I purpose a new understanding of Hartian theory.With the textual support and the relevant concepts and discussions in meta-ethics,I will explain Hart as an expressivist based on the Analytic Theory,and face the challenges to Hart by other theorists.I will argue that to restate Hart as an expressivist can reserve Hart’s text and his important theoretical contribution: the distinction between internal and external statements.And this expressivist reading can defend Hart from the criticisms of Dworkin.I will argue that in contrast with the popular Existence Condition Theory,the expressivist routine of Hart is more promising.