The Patent Aggregation Models And Its Regulation Of Non Practicing Entities Under Antitrust Law

The enterprise acquires technologies through R&D or purchase from the market.Thus,patent has become an important matter to be used in manufacturing products and/or in trading technologies.In this context,a new business model,Non Practicing Entities(NPE),is emerging.Non Practicing Entities model focuses on purchasing patent and then asserting patent right against manufacturer who are using that patented technology,rather than developing and transferring technology.Furthermore,some Non Practicing Entities are compiling the relevant patents,boarding them,and asserting the rights of these patents,which do not contribute any product to the world.The activities of these Non Practicing Entities have damaged the original purpose of patent mechanism.They assemble portfolios of weak patents to corner and dominate technological spaces,crowd out innovators and demanding extortionate licensing fees from unsuspecting target,which may violate public interests and shall be regulated.The aim of this research is to discuss when and how to use antitrust law to regulate patent aggregation activities.This thesis firstly discusses the concept and basic characteristics of Non Practicing Entities and then distinguishes the business models of NPE.They assemble portfolios of patents and dominate technological spaces,crowd out innovators and demanding extortionate licensing fees from some target,which may violate public interests and shall be regulated.Then it describes the anticompetitive behaviors of NPE,which includes concluding horizontal monopoly agreement,abuse of market dominant position,package licensing and so on.Further,this study analyses comparatively the similarities and differences of the relevant antitrust legal rules between the US and EU.Based on these analyses,this thesis gives constructive suggestions in revising the relevant legal rules of Chinese Antitrust Law.