| I have objectively studied the internal mechanism of collective corruption caused by herd behavior.In the background of misappropriation of corruption in large enterprises,and basing on the characteristics of collective corruption,I constructed two theoretical models of herd effect and deduced them.I found that in the case of having public information,corruption decision makers will constantly amend their own judge of risk of being investigated and carried out herd behavior on the motive of maximizing the gains,thus forming collective corruption.According to this internal mechanism,I propose a way to control the herding effect is to gradually increase the penalties of corruptors who later entered the corrupt group,in order to effectively manage the corruption forecast for the expected fines.Further,on the basis of the theoretical model,I designed and carried out laboratory experiments.Although the behavior of the subjects is not entirely rational and can not be accurately predicted by the theoretical model,the experimental results still support the theoretical model.In experiments with public information and constant penalties,the subjects’ herd behavior was significantly higher than than in the absence of public information.However,after the punishment intensity was adjusted based on public information,the herding effect has significantly reduced.So I think that the existing penalties may not be able to effectively curb the herd behavior,if we want to curb herd behavior,we need to gradually increase the punish.If we want to curb herd behavior,we need to gradually increase the punishment of those who later entered.In addition,we found that in the private information experiment,the subjects are not entirely in accordance with private information to make decisions,so the subjects are not completely rational.In the experiment with the greatest effect of the herd,the decision of the subjects was the most rational,and the herd behavior could help the subjects to maximize the benefits. |