Research On Incentive Mechanism About Enterprises’ Low-carbon Development Under Asymmetric Information

With the arrival of low-carbon economy era,low-carbon development model has gradually become the mainstream model,So enterprises bear a greater environmental responsibility as the main body of in economic developing.If enterprises do not pay attention to environmental protection,ignore low-carbon emissions in the daily production activities,This will have a great impact on the entire social economy.Therefore,Enterprises’ low-carbon development is very necessary from the current situation,but because of the particularity of enterprise development itself,which will involve many aspects requiring its low-carbon emission reduction,especially the interests of each subject.At the same time,the interaction between different subjects is complex and non-linear,which will result in unpredictable and not adjustable behavior.So enterprises are unable to make it without the coordination and cooperation between governments at all levels in the process of seeking low-carbon development,it needs to consider the interests of both sides.In a word,the research of enterprise low-carbon development incentive mechanism is a complex system engineering.At present,the research on the incentive mechanism of low-carbon development has become an academic hotspot,which emphasizes cooperation between enterprises and government and the pursuit of a win-win situation.However,the difference of interest starting point between enterprises and government determines the interest goals are not consistent.Because enterprises want to seek for maximize profits,they generally do not provide their own low-carbon technology and efforts to reduce emissions and other private information to the government in order to obtain rent-seeking space,and then moral hazard and adverse selection problems are prevalent.The government emphasizes environmental benefits,hoping that enterprises can maximize their low-carbon capacity and make the greatest efforts to carry out low-carbon emission reduction.Therefore,the design of incentives to encourage enterprises to carry out low-carbon development is the realities faced by governments at all levels.On the basis of literature analysis,this thesis uses a variety of theories to study how the government designs effective incentive mechanism to overcome the above problems,which provides some reference about the formulation of incentive policies of enterprises’ low-carbon development for governments at all levels.Firstly,by comparing the separation incentive mechanism under dual asymmetric information of moral hazard and adverse selection with the single information asymmetry with only one moral hazard,The research shows that the former is superior to the latter.It can improve the efficiency of the incentive system and realize the information screening.Secondly,this thesis focuses on the screening contract considering the continuous characteristics of low-carbon technology level under dual asymmetric information,which is more realistic.It can not only reveal the real low-carbon technology capabilities of enterprises,but also induce enterprises to improve the degree of low-carbon emission reduction efforts.Therefore,the government should design different incentive models for different firms,which can not only play the role of self-selection screening,but also induce enterprises to improve the level of low-carbon efforts.Finally,considering the vertical multi-task characteristics of enterprises,that is,the synergy between different tasks,and dividing enterprises’effort into two dimensions,including the pursuit of current emission reduction and low-carbon technological progress,this thesis has built multi-period dynamic incentive mechanism for low-carbon development of enterprises based on multi-task principal-agent model.It can find that this incentive mechanism has obvious Pareto improvement and can effectively avoid short-term effects,which is beneficial to the long-term low-carbon reduction of enterprises.