| This paper attempts to study the relationship between the voluntary disclosure of information and investment authorized quota. Voluntary information disclosure has always been one of the most important academic fields when discussing the "principal- agent" problem. For this moment, there is a deep and comprehensive research on the motivation and influencing factors of the voluntary disclosure, however, little research is about the connection between voluntary disclosure and investment authorized quota. This paper argues that there is a connection between the voluntary information disclosure and investment authorized quota on the time series, therefore it makes sense to model and simulate their connection, which means expanding the field of academic research.Through theoretical model and numerical simulation, we found that for talented agents, they can achieve a higher investment authorized quota through more voluntary disclosure. In contrast, if the agents are not gifted, shareholders can reduce their risk by limiting the investment authorized quota. The achievement of the study undoubtedly helps to improve the academic fields of voluntary disclosure, especially the motivation of voluntary disclosure.Finally, this paper argues that the investment authorized quota is an important arrangements relating to corporate governance and operating results. If our conclusion that the board of directors can achieve a higher investment authorized quota through voluntary disclosure can be confirmed by the regulators and put into practice, It will help reduce the overinvestment of listed companies or inefficient investment which will means much to enhance the management of listed companies and as well to improve the performance of the company. |
