E-commerce Platform Antitrust And Regulation Analysis Based On Two-sided Market

Under the background of the information age, large shopping malls, e-commerce platform(Taobao and tmall, Jingdong, Vipshop, etc.) have broadly access to public view,which accepted and used by consumers and companies.These economic forms exist certain similarities,that exist a media platform,on which consumers and manufacturers linked to trade. The platform is the platform of two-sided markets, this type of market is two-sided markets. Compared to the single market, bilateral market has its own characteristics, such as bilateral market platform network externalities, structure of platform price non symmetry. In recent years, the bilateral market develop rapidly and its operation mechanism is different from one-side market, and the bilateral market theory and system construction is relatively backward, so the development process appeared many problems,such as 3Q war, the rank of Baidu contest price and so on. Therefore, to form a good market competition rank order, the government should make the market regulation policy,which is one of the important topics in the theoretical research.Therefore, this article conducted by two aspects around the theoretical model research and case studies, both to support each other. Theoretical study is about proposition and mathematical derivation.At the same time, case study will enrich and perfect the theory model. In this paper, the main research content is divided into the following several parts:Firstly, define the relevant market. Any monopolistic behavior occurs within a certain range of market. In the bilateral market E-commerce platform of antitrust analysis, the relevant market definition has a leading role. In the bilateral market on the definition of related markets should draw lessons from the side of a single market ideas, according to the type of market, the bilateral market bilateral or unilateral; give a reasonable defination to product free of charge, appropriate SSNIP test methods can be chosen according to the type of market. In the 3Q war case, the Tencent does exist with market dominance behavior,bundled with their own anti-virus software, forcing QQ users to make a choice, which harm the interests of the 360 and the consumer’s right to choose.Secondly, analyze the electronic e-commerce platform pricing and regulation, basedon Armstrong and Hotelling model.Joined the network scale of this factor, market monopoly and competition market pricing model is established. Bilateral market of the electronic e-commerce platform of competition Lerner index must be high than the market of monopoly, two market implement asymmetric price structure.The piatform charge lower prices or even free of charge to the buyer, higher prices is charged to the seller. The price structure and price subsidies belongs to the proper behavior in the bilateral market, should not be regulated.Thirdly,the barriers to entry. According to the unilateral market entering barrier concept and the factors of influencing unilateral market entry barriers, e-electronic platform of bilateral market business affairs in product differentiation, capital demand and the scale economy presented new characteristics, this paper argues that should be combined the unilateral market barriers regulation of the ideas and characteristics of two-sided market, carefully implemented barriers to entry regulation.Finally, analyze the bilateral market of e-electronic platform business affairs behavior regulation, the main analysis is product bundling, credit rules and relative dominance.Firstly,for product bundling, many product bundling can improve consumer utility and social welfare level, but somewhat product bundling also damage the consumer interests and the right to choose. So in the regulation we should combine with the market power of enterprise platform, explicitly illegal tying behavior criterion, and illegal tying behavior on some platforms for antitrust investigation.Secondly, regulating credit. Due to asymmetric information problems, electronic commerce platform produce adverse selection and moral hazard, it is necessary to strengthen the construction of credit value, strengthen the disclosure of information, improve the relevant legislation of e-commerce; consumers themselves should strengthen screening capacity. Finally, the abuse of market dominant position behavior. The abuse of market dominant position is not named in the anti monopoly law and regulations. However, this paper argues that business platform of the act disrupt the market economic order, hindered the healthy competition, which need regulation. The details of the behavior must be legally provised; improve the supervision system of market main body; play the role of industry associations.