Research On The Impact Of The Senior Managers’ Shareholding Increase、Independent Directors On Corporate Value

With the completion of the shareholder structure reform, the senior managers’ shareholding increase become more and more popular in Chinese listed companies. As the enterprise operators and managers, the senior executives have an advantage on some insider information. The senior managers’shareholding increase is considered to be pass good information of the company’s future business development to the market. The investors believe that the senior executives would become more active participation in corporate governance and enhance the value of the company after they increase its stakes. Because their own interests and the interests of the company are consistent. However the information asymmetry between the owners and the senior executives are easily caused by executives of the "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" problem. What could result in more serious financial fraud. In order to ease the conflict of interest between the executives and the owners, and protect the interests of the minority shareholders. Independent director gradually enter the investor’s horizon. Previous research focuses that the impact of the senior managers’ shareholding increase or independent directors on company value. This paper tries to introduce the impact of the senior managers’shareholding increase、independent directors on corporate value, and explores the differences that the impact of the senior managers’ shareholding increase、independent directors on corporate value in different ownership property of listed companies.This dissertation contains five chapters. The first chapter is an introduction, which describes the research background and significance, related literature review home and abroad the influencing factors of corporate value that the senior managers’ shareholding increase and independent directors, research ideas and framework, research innovation and characteristics. The second chapter is relevant theoretical basis, which defines the relevant concepts in this paper, and discuss the information asymmetry theory, the principal-agent theory, the signal transmission theory and so on. The third chapter is theoretical analysis and research hypothesis, which shows current situation and problem of the senior managers’shareholding increase and independent directors in Chinese listed companies, in-depth analyze the effect of path that the senior managers’shareholding increase and independent directors on the corporatevalue. On the basis of that,I propose the research hypothesis. The fourth chapter is empirical analysis. In this chapter, data are filtered through listed companies that happened the senior managers’ increase the shares Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares board from 2010 to 2014 as the research sample. I design variables and construct the model, make descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and multiple linear regression analysis, based on the sample data empirically test of the senior managers’ shareholding increase and independent directors on corporate value. The fifth chapter is research conclusions and suggestions and future research prospects. The results of this dissertation show that:(1) Between the senior managers’shareholding increase and company value was significant positive correlation; (2) Between the proportion of independent directors and corporate value was significant positive correlation; (3) The interaction term that the senior managers’shareholding increase and the proportion of the independent directors and corporate value is showing significant negative correlation; (4) Compared with the state-owned listed company, in the private listed company, the influence of the senior managers’shareholding increase and independent directors on corporate value is more significant. Because most of the listed company exist many unreasonable ownership structure problem, which is restructured from state-owned enterprises, the state-owned shares "dominance" phenomenon of the limit of the executives of listed companies holdings of behavior and independent directors role play.