A Study Of The Impact Of Executives’ Power On The Accounting Information Disclosure Quality Of Listed Corporation In China

Under the situation of information asymmetry,the accounting information would be disclosed by executives of listed companies so that investors, creditors and other information users can have a comprehensive understanding of financial status and operating results. Financial information is one of the major methods of getting information for the stakeholders to know the company operating situation and make decisions. Therefore, the quality of accounting information has a direct impact on investors’ decisions, orderly development of the securities market and allocation of resources.As the manager of the company, the executive team managers directly involve in collecting, generating and disclosing, and have a significant response to the quality of accounting information. The article just analysis how the executive power characteristics of different nature influence the quality of its accounting information disclosed. In this article, the company’s alternative evaluation of information in Shenzhen Stock Exchange can be used to substitute of the quality of accounting information, whether the board chairman and general manager be one can be used to evaluate the structural power of executives, whether the executives holding stocks can be used to evaluate the executives power, and using the length of employment to evaluate the power of individual ability.Firstly, the researches about the quality of information disclosure and executives’ power would be reviewed. Secondly, based on the separation of ownership and principalagent theory, asymmetric information theory, behavioral theory and upper echelons theory, the impact of the power features on the quality of the accounting information would be analysis, which laid the theoretical foundation for the empirical analysis of the full text of the study. And then, 580 samples of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange that ranged from 2010 to 2014 to research would be chosen. And next, the relationship of the quality of information and the power of managers would be tested by the multivariate ordered panel Logit model. Finally, some suggestions of improve the quality of disclosure would be advanced based on the results of empirical analysis.Through a descriptive analysis, in the information disclosure, the quality of accounting information of listed companies in China has been improved year by year would be found. In managers, 77%-86% companies still hold the state of two jobs separation. And in these companies, the board maintained independence well, is conducive to the improvement of the quality of disclosure. Shareholding executives of listed companies accounted 60%-70% among all the samples, it is a high proportion to help enhance the company’s executives hero consciousness and the performance of the company, and to improve the quality of accounting information disclosure. Meanwhile, China’s listed companies financial officers changed frequently, which is not conducive to improve the quality of accounting information disclosure.The research indicates that the structural power and the quality of accounting information are negatively correlated by the multivariate ordered panel Logit model. The property power and the individual ability power have a positive impact on the quality. Thus, it should be made clearly that the listed companies should avoid two jobs concurrently, increase managers’ stake proportion through equity incentives, and focus on training professional ability of executives in the last section of this article.