Cooperative Space Of Virtual Power Plants And Conventional Units Under Carbon Trading Mechanism

Distributed generation using renewable energy has high stand-alone access cost and control problems because of its fluctuation and uncertainty of output. Microgrid and virtual power plant are two main methods of solving grid-integration of distributed generators. Along with the increasing penetration of distributed generation including renewable sources, it’s important to achieve stable output and low carbon emission utilizing conventional units and both get maximum benefit.The existing carbon emissions trading mechanism is studied and the initial allocation methods of carbon emission rights are summarized. This paper proposes a new allocation method of initial carbon emission right considering the environmental capacity margin under different regions. The advantages and disadvantages of each allocation method are compared by examples. By starting from existing carbon emission trading mechanism, it is assumed that virtual power plants participate in the Clean Development Mechanism and conventional units the carbon emissions trading market. The cooperative space of virtual power plants and conventional units is analyzed which is formed by the complementarity of carbon emission, reserve and generating cost and the cooperative benefits are allocated by Shapley method. Then the effects of carbon emission model, conventional unit type, the accuracy of power forecasting and carbon prices on the cooperation of virtual power plants and conventional units is analyzed. A quantitative analysis can be provided for cooperative negotiation between virtual power plants and conventional units.This paper also studies the cooperative game model when the virtual power plant and conventional units participate in multi time market and faced with different price mechanisms. Considering virtual power plant output uncertainty and the market price uncertainty the model analyzes cooperative space between virtual power plant and conventional units and both power energy allocation. Then the effects of the accuracy of power forecasting and premium prices on the cooperation of virtual power plants and conventional units and power energy allocation is analyzed. A quantitative analysis can be provided for virtual power plant’s participation in several markets and for cooperative negotiation between virtual power plants and conventional units.