| Related research about early corporate governance mainly concentrated on the principal-agent relationship between owners and managers under the condition of diffuse ownership, this kind of principal-agent relationship is the logical starting point of modern corporate governance. With the development of corporate governance practice and academic research, more and more phenomenon and the research shows that, the circumstances of the equity concentration of the enterprise are common in most countries, ultimate controlling shareholders that in the position of control usually exist in the listed companies. The private enterprise is an important part of national economy in our country, through the study we found that, the phenomenon of that the ultimate controlling shareholder realize the separation of control right and cash flow right by building pyramid shareholding structure, and so on, is very widespread in private listed companies in our country. On one hand, the existence of large shareholder control could relieve the traditional problem of agency between shareholders and managers, so as to enhance the value of the company, on the other hand, it could also lead to the problem of agency between major shareholders and small & medium shareholders, therefore, the effect of large shareholder control on the value of company is a double-edged sword. So, what is it the effect of large shareholder control on the value of company in the case of two rights separation widespread? How does the control characteristics of ultimate controlling shareholder effect his behavior of propping and tunneling on the listed company, and what kind of relationship does exists between the each control variable and the value of the company? These are the core research problems of this paper.On the basis of review on the research about the related field of the scholars at home and abroad in the past, this paper puts forward further research direction, analyzes the internal logic of that large shareholder control under two rights separation effects on the value of company, extends the model of interests occupation(LLSV,2002) and concludes the relationship between different control characteristics of the ultimate controlling shareholder and his benefit expropriation behavior as well as the value of the company under the two rights separation through the formula derivation, thus puts forward the research hypothesis. At the same time, this paper puts Tobin’s Q, economic value added and comprehensive financial indicator as the proxy variable, do the empirical research about the relationship between the control characteristics of the variable of ultimate controlling shareholder which include cash flow right, control right, and two rights separation degree and the value of listed companies from three different perspectives which are at the views of market value, ability of value creation and comprehensive financial performance respectively.The research of this paper finds that, cash flow right of ultimate controlling shareholder forms the interests synergistic effect, which has a promoting effect on the value of the company under the three kinds of view. This paper also verifies control right of ultimate controlling shareholder was positively related with the value of private listed company under the three kinds of view, it means that, with the rise of control right, the ultimate controlling shareholder is more inclined to prop the development of listed companies in order to get more shared benefit of control, rather than get private profit by tunneling. About the relationship between the two rights separation degree and the value of the company, this paper puts Tobin’s Q and economic value added as the proxy variable of value of the company, and f that the two rights separation and the value of company behave in negative correlation, it is consistent with the most of the existing research. However, under the perspective of comprehensive ability of company, this paper put comprehensive financial indicator as the proxy variable of value of company, and found that as the ascension of two rights separation, the value of the company present the changing trend of firstly rising and then falling, this shows that, within a certain range, the two rights separation comprehensive ability have a certain promotion effect on the company comprehensive ability, but, if the two rights separation is too high, it will violate of the value of the company. Therefore, from the overall, the higher degree of separation of ultimate controlling shareholder is, the easier it makes violation to the value of the company. Finally, this paper puts forward corresponding policy suggestions based on the analysis and conclusion of this paper. |
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