Research On The Incentive Model About Managers Considering The Stock Option

Managers’incentive model is based on incentive theory and principal-agent theory. How to design an appropriate managers’ incentive model is very important in the payment management, and many practitioners and researchers has paid much attention to it. As the economy and operating situations develop rapidly and the principal-agent model is enriched, the traditional managers’incentive model cannot meet the researchers and practitioners’need. Such as the traditional performance measure standard is threatened and. challenged, the non-monetary quantitative research and so on. So to improve the traditional managers’ incentive model is necessary now.To improve the traditional managers’incentive model, we select relative EVA as the performance measure standard, and have combination of the monetary and non-monetary incentive, also add single agent-single job-double objectives to the traditional managers’ incentive model considering the stock option. We make a research on managers’incentive model considering the stock option and make relative EVA the performance measure standard. According to the models we have built, we get some follow results:relative EVA as performance measure standard is more correct and effective; non-monetary incentive is necessary; improving the monopolies surplus can increase the effort of managers; the single agent-single job-double objectives incentive model is significant; the incentive of the stock option also can increase the effort of managers.According to the results, to optimize the managers’incentive model, this paper makes some important suggestions, then concludes the major work we have done, points out the limitations and creativity, and puts forward the prospect of the future research.