Research On Supply Chain Game Theory Model For Extended Warranty Provided By Strong Retailer

Along with the more and more intense market competition and the changing status of node enterprise in the supply chain, the retailer dominating the supply chain is more and more common. As today’s network economy is more and more developed, network externality by influencing the goods will further affect the extended warranty service of the goods. In reality, people all are not completely rational when making decisions but often characterized by a certain fairness preferences. This paper constructed a retailer-leading supply chain system considering the extended warranty(EW) with single manufacturer and single retailer to study the influence of network externality and fairness respectively on retailer-leading supply chain coordination.First of all, we analyzed and compared the retail price, EW price, EW quality, and the total system profit in centralized and decentralized model respectively. Then we analyzed the influence of network externalities on decision variables and system profits, and found that the network externality increases the loss of decision efficiency. After that, we considered the coordination of the supply chain system with extended warranty.Then based on fairness, we constructed a retailer-leading supply chain system considering the extended warranty(EW) with single manufacturer and single retailer to study the influence of fairness on retailer-leading supply chain coordination. First of all, we analyzed and compared the retail price, EW price, EW quality, and the total system profit in the models of manufacturer and retailer with fairness respectively after constructing centralized and decentralized model. Then we analyzed the influence of fairness on decision variables and system profits, and found that the fairness increased the loss of decision efficiency. After that, we considered the coordination of the supply chain system with extended warranty by the way of two-part tariff and found that the two-part tariff in the model of retailer with fairness had better coordination effect than in the model of manufacturer with fairness because its system profit was more close to the centralized model. And at that time, retailer obtained super profit while manufacturer only got its retained profit. Finally, some numerical examples were presented for further analysis. Finally, some numerical examples were presented for further analysis.