Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard Control Of Baby Well-being Insurance Policyholders’

Insurance is a kind of risk transfer mechanism. Through this kind of transfer mechanism, the individual’s risk will be transferred to the insurance company to undertake. When the insured risk occurs the accident, The insurance company will compensate for the loss. Insurance companies will gain profit through risk management. However, insurance companies often at a loss as a result of poor risk management. This paper takes AE insurance company’s the baby well-being insurance launched in Hebei branch as an example to analyze the causes for the product loss, then puts forward some suggestions and countermeasures for improvement, and summarizes the experiences and lessons from the case.The introduction part mainly presents the background and significance of this thesis, the research methods, as well as the main content and structure of the thesis. In theoretical literature part, mainly reviews the related theories and research achievements on risk, risk management, asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral risk. Then it introduces in detail about the baby well-being insurance scheme, sales and insurance status, and claims, and analyses main causes of the product losses with some of the suggestions and countermeasures which lies in strengthening the control and management of risk by correcting target market positioning, improve product design and strengthen claims management. In the conclusion part, it summarizes the research conclusion, the lessons should be learned from, and deficiency and limitation of the research, and expects for further research and prospect.