Study On The Relationship Between The Executives Shareholding And Corporate Performance Of Listed Companies

With the improvement of the modern enterprise management system, company operation and management more normalization and specialization, the vast majority of the company hired a specialized management team to run a company, it also makes the ownership and operation separate situation more and more common, causing the principal-agent problems also become a problem in the corporate governance. In order to alleviate the two rights separation and interests brought by the inconsistent problem, companies need to establish a long-term incentive mechanism to restrain the operator. Incentive mechanism of executive shareholding as a kind of commonly used early is widely used in foreign countries. Our country in recent years has begun to widely used executives shareholding as incentive mechanism. Scholars at home and abroad in terms of executives shareholding’s influence on the company’s business to make some research, and the current research results, for no unified executives shareholding relationship with corporate performance, and the majority of research on the main board of the listed company, study of listed on the gem companies are few. So for the gem companies have their own characteristics, its executives shareholding relationship with corporate performance comply with the laws of main board listed companies need to be researched.Based on the GEM listed companies as the research object, this paper analysis the executives shareholding impact on corporate performance. In defining the executives shareholding and corporate performance and investment behavior, on the basis of related concepts, and the relationship between corporate performance and executive ownership theory analysis and put forward the hypothesis, selecting the gem in 2011-2013 financial data of listed companies as research samples, establish mathematical model, in the model selection return on total assets, management ownership, ownership concentration and equity balance degree, such as the ratio of investment spending indicators, using EXLEL, SPSS software to multiple regression analysis of data, such as the following four conclusions:(1) the gem listed companies management ownership and investment behavior were positively correlated, ownership concentration and equity balance degree is negatively related to the investment behavior;(2) the gem listed company investment behavior appears inverted "U" type relationship with corporate performance;(3) the gem listed company executives holding positive correlation with corporate performance;(4) investment behavior in the gem executives shareholding and corporate performance of listed companies has a mediating role. In this paper, the research questions for the gem listed company executives shareholding incentive mechanism provides a theoretical reference.