Study On The Impact Of Managerial Labor Market On Executives’ Corruptions

Corporate executives corruption refers to corporate executives’ behaviors which are for personal gain while led to decline enterprise’ and the shareholders’ interests. Its essence is the power rent-seeking performance of the executives. Good external corporate governance mechanism is one of effective ways to governance corporate executive’s corruptions. This paper attempts to study the effects on executive corruption constrain in perspective of managerial labor market competition.Since our country adopted the economy policy of gradual reform, which leads to different process of market for managerial labor in various sectors and regions. This paper based on the analysis of the differences in sectors and regions of managerial labor market and the current situation of executive’s corruption, then executives corruption of listing corporations happened from 2004 to 2014 are taken as the research sample empirical test how regional, industry manager market impact on executives corruption with principal component analysis, logistic regression analysis and other statistical methods. In addition, the research also constructed the index to measure the managerial labor market creatively according to executives’ replacement of region and industry differences, the executives’ external compensation differences and labor mobility.The results of the research show that:(1)The managerial labor market competition’s constrain effects on executive corruptions is stronger in the east regions than in the central and west regions, in the non-monopoly industries than the monopoly industry;(2) For private enterprises, the managerial labor market’s competition have some constrain on corporate executive corruptions, and the constrain effects increases while the degree of the region and industry managerial labor market become strong, that is the process of region and industry managerial market and private enterprise executives corruption had significant negative correlation. But as to the failure of the state owned enterprise managerial labor market, the managerial labor market does not constrain the state owned enterprises’ executive corruptions.