| In principal-agent theory background, Stock Option is regarded as an important method that can well solve the inconsistency of objective between entruster and entrustee. The system of Stock Option has been popular in Europe and the United States enterprises in the early 1980s. But in China, Stock Option system is in the "Stock Option management measures" (implement) listing Corporation issued after the gradual in our enterprise promotion, until now, Stock Option system has already obtained a certain degree development in enterprises in china.Stock Option system has a variety of incentive mode, but in China, the stock option incentive as a concrete manifestation of Stock Option system, is the most popular incentive methods, based on statistical data obtained from the country in Tai’an, found that the option incentive system accounted for more than 80% of all our Stock Options the system which is an important incentive system. Because the universality and importance of stock option incentive system, through the discussion of the role of the incentive system of executive option which actual influence on the performance of enterprises, can the implementation of executive option incentive for domestic enterprises to whether and how the implementation of executive option incentive provided effective and feasible reference, has the important practical significance.Therefore, this paper studies about the how stock option incentive for executives will influence corporate performance, first from the theoretical view. The former researches summarized the corresponding theoretical analysis theory of Stock Option mechanism of the effect of option incentive, laid the theoretical foundation for the empirical study. Secondly, through the analysis of the current status of the implementation of stock option incentive in China’s corporation according to China’s specific situation. So as to build the empirical model suited to China’s national conditions. Collected descriptive statistics of relevant variables and regression analysis will be carried out on the model, found in the incentive system of executive in China have positive effect on corporations’performance significantly. Stock option incentive period and corporate performance is negatively related. And the ratio of shares held by executive has no significant impact on corporate performance. The causes of these results are the low proportion of management shareholding in China’s securities market which is not completely efficient, and the shares of the company can not reflect the performance of the company. Therefore it weakened the incentive effect of stock options. Finally, according to the research conclusions, this paper puts forward policy recommendations corresponding from the government angle as well as from the angle of enterprise of this two respects. At the same time, the end of the article points out the limitations of this study and future research direction of development, in the hope that future research to further improve the. |
