Structure Selection And Coordination On Distribution Channel Of Travel Products

With the rapid development of electronic commerce and the increasing intensity of competition in the market, the network marketing models based on the Internet have been increasingly recognized by the public, Travel products enterprises are trying their best to open up the online channel to enhance their marketing strength. In such an opportunity, those problems caused by the diversification of channels emerge one after another, members in the supply chain system are also facing with series of new challenges, such as the channel conflict and channel competition. Under the background of dual channel supply chain, the thesis chooses travel products as the main research object, and three different dual channel structures, including the posted-price retail distribution channel, online direct distribution channel, and Name Your Own Price(NYOP) distribution channel, should be considered. Then, the thesis develops the aggregate demand function based on the consumer utility theory, and the supply chain structure selection and equilibrium of each subject in the travel products distribution channels are researched and analyzed by the game theory.This thesis simultaneously considers two mathematical models both the market state of relatively static and the market state of relatively dynamic, and several analysis conclusions should be drawn from the equilibrium solutions of each structure under different models. In the market state of relatively static, dual-channel structure contains online direct marketing enables the supplier to obtain more profits than the simplex posted-price channel structure. While, in the market state of relatively dynamic, it is advantageous for the retailer in the dual-channel structure with NYOP channel, in which the posted-price retailer should obtain some advantages and consumers can get more consumer surpluses than in either the posted-price or the online direct distribution channel.Then, this thesis discusses the dual-channel supply chain coordination strategy of travel products under the revenue sharing contract mechanism, and how the revenue sharing contract affects each subject in the travel products distribution channels. There is a fixed contract parameter enables the retailer’s and the supplier’s profits between non-coordination and within-coordination are equal in the dual-channel supply chain structure with two posted-price retailers. While, in the dual-channel supply chain structure with the direct channel and the NYOP channel, most of the profits increased by the revenue sharing contract should be apportioned by the supplier. One of the main reasons should be that the supplier determines the wholesale price in the decision order of the supply chain system and the retail price is determined after, and the first-mover advantage owned by the supplier makes the retailer unable to obtain great profits in any case.