Managers’ Compensation And Performance Correlation In Fluence On Accounting Conservatism

With the development of our country’s economy,Expanding the scale of the enterprise,Benefits are also growing,Managers remuneration should along with the growth of the enterprise benefit. however, In real life,there are another kind of phenomenon, when corporate performance decline, executives are still holding to higher compensation, this question, caused the people doubt.Especially enterprise system gradually established,ownership and managerial authority are separation.The agent in order to get a higher salary,They often hide enterprise actual operation result.And the client in order to prevent such moral hazard, alleviate conflicts,they ofen use accounting conservatism, the incentives as a governance mechanism.If the accounting conservatism has deducted from making false or true profit and loss of function,enterprises continue to strengthen and implement accounting conservatism, whether can truly constraint managers implement opportunism behavior? reduce the possibility of manager for their own defense.Based on the norms and empirical analysis methods, research correlation with managers’ compensation and performance, and robustness of the relationship.theoretical part of the study show that managers’ compensation and performance will have a two-way effect, adopt the design of the compensation plan,it can realizing shareholder incentives,and this method that based on performance accord with shareholder interest maximization goal, but also can produce the managers by tampering with the phenomenon of performance increase additional income to defend their own self-interest behavior.Therefore, managers and shareholders try to alleviate the fight for interest,the shareholders require companies to pay attention to strengthen accounting conservatism,they think this approach can inhibit the error message,reducing the need for managers pay reasonable defense. certainly, manager’s self-interest behavior also depend on other reasons,finally,the paper also expounds the managers’ compensation and performance correlation influence on accounting conservatism,considering these influence factors and analyzing them,we can find these effects how to work.On the basic of the theory are reviewed.we decide to further inspection through the empirical analysis.2010-2013 listed companies of A stock as the research object,frist, we reference FangJunXiong(2009) model and using multiple regression in order to study the managers’ compensation and performance correlation,second,Accounting conservatism measures reference Basu(1997) thought judgment. The results showed that:(1)managers’ compensation and corporate performance was significantly positive correlation;(2)the stronger the managers’ compensation and corporate performance,the lower the accounting conservatism; in addition,the text in the managers’ compensation and performance relationship considered compensation defense needs,we can say, it added a new perspective for the article.Finally, the paper puts forward some following Suggestions,:company should adjust the structure of corporate governance.decrease the number of board members in the compensation committee, avoid the double identity affect the supervisor and supervisee,improve company independence; Taking the appropriate pay indicator around performanceand added some additional incentive index.From the perspective of accounting conservatism stakeholders demand improve accounting conservatism.