Research On The Relationship Among Ownership Structure、Equity Incentive And The Agency Cost Of Listed Companies On GEM

Along with the development of the economy, separation of the two rights is a common phenomenon in modern enterprises, asymmetric information makes one party of the information advantage may appear moral hazard, and adverse selection problem, even would raise questions about the agency cost between shareholders and executives. Pilot implementation of equity incentive system has been in China for some time. During this period, legal system of China’s capital market gradually developed and was perfected, and corporate governance structure increasingly would be perfect. On January 1, 2006, the China securities regulatory commission promulgated the "measures for the management of the listed company equity incentive(try out)" regulation, the development of listed company equity incentive of our country ushered in the good times. Since the October 23, 2009,on board of the gem market in China, more and more of the gem listed companies realized the importance of enterprise human capital, gradually began to implement equity incentive system.This article selects the listed companies of implementation of equity incentive system of Shenzhen gem as the research object, through the analysis of the current situation of the implementation of equity incentive of the gem listed company, the goal is to explore the relationship between the ownership concentration and the choice of enterprise about whether the equity incentive, the relationship of executives shareholding with the enterprise whether to choose equity incentive, and according to rate of the general manager ownership, listed companies of the equity incentive is divided into two groups to analyze whether the implementation of equity incentive can effectively reduce the agency cost under different cases of general manager shareholding. Two kinds of hypothesis correlation about equity incentive and the agency cost is consistency of the interests hypothesis and entrenchment effect hypothesis. Through study on the gem listed company equity incentive’s conditions, this article discussed under different equity structure what hypotheses can play a role leading to explain that allows companies to determine whether to adopt equity incentive under different ownership structure, equity incentive can reduce agency costs in different cases of the general manager shareholding.Through theory and empirical analysis on equity incentive of the gem listed company, it is concluded that:(1) The relationship of the ownership concentration and whether the listed company select equity incentive is the negative correlation, that is to say, ownership concentration is high, the enterprise does not tend to choose equity incentive, ownership concentration is low, the enterprises tend to choose equity incentive. Reason is that ownership concentration is higher, ability and desire of the shareholders to strengthen the supervision of managers, also don’t need to implement equity incentive.(2) The relationship of the ownership concentration and the proportion of equity incentive is significantly negative correlation, that is to say, the equity concentration is greater, the proportion of equity incentive is lower.(3) In the proportion of the general manager at high stake, equity incentive and the agency cost has significant positive correlation. Reason is that the proportion of the general manager is higher, the implementation of equity incentive became welfare equity incentive to set for executives themselves. it does not reduce agency cost, will make the agency cost increases.(4) ownership of general manager is lower, equity incentive and the agency cost has significantly negative correlation. Reason is that when the proportion of the general manager is lower, the implementation of equity incentive is the real equity incentive, can make the managers have a sense of belonging, work hard, then reduce agency costs.