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The Nature Of Ultimate Ownership 、managerial Overconfidence And The Merger And Acquisitions Performance

Posted on:2016-05-11Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y W GengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330470960535Subject:Business Administration
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Merger and acquisitions(M&A), as one of the principle ways for rapid expansion of enterprises, plays an important role of capital circulation and adjustment of industrial structure. With China′s economy coming into a high-speed development, the M&A is more and more popular. However, numerous studies have shown that most of the M&A did not increase the shareholder wealth, but instead brought damage to the shareholder. Previous studies tried to explain the cause of the “M&A performance paradox” from different angle, but most of them are based on the rational managers. Thus, exploring the paradox based on the behavioral economic theory from the perspective of managers irrational has important theoretical significance and practical significance.This article is divided into six parts. The first chapter summarizes the significance and defines several key variables, then expound the framework and the main content. The second chapter reviews the domestic and foreign related researches from the M&A performance paradox, managerial overconfidence and M&A, the property of ultimate ownership and M&A. The third chapter expounds the“ M&A performance paradox”, overconfidence theory and M&A theory, analyzes under the different ultimate ownership managerial overconfidence′s influence on M&A performance, proposes three assumptions in the end. The fourth chapter uses listed companies in M&A during 2008 ~ 2010 as samples, reflects the performance of enterprises by 10 financial indicators, uses the factor analysis method to carry on the empirical analysis. The results verify the existence of the paradox of M&A performance. The fifth chapter tests the influence of managers overconfidence on M&A performance empirically, mainly adopts the descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis, then divides the samples according to the property of ultimate controller in comparison. Results show that the managerial overconfidence is negatively related to the M&A performance. Otherwise, in state-owned enterprise managers overconfidence has the more negative impact on M&A performance relative to the private enterprise. The sixth chapter summarizes the empirical conclusion, puts forward the corresponding policy recommendations, and pointed out the limitations and further research prospect of research.
Keywords/Search Tags:the nature of ultimate ownership, managerial overconfidence, M&A performance
PDF Full Text Request
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