Research On The Influence Of Information Asymmetric To The Enterprise Investment Efficiency

In modern enterprise theory, whether it is based on the perspective of contract theory andcorporate governance-agent theory, or the enterprise into the capital market environmentanalysis of enterprise investment and financing decision research, information asymmetry hasalways been the core content and important issues. Combined with China’s capital market, theanalysis shows more value and practical significance of the problem.We expounded the influence of the efficiency of the enterprise investment behaviormechanism from the theoretical level of adverse selection caused by asymmetric information.From the perspective of adverse selection caused by asymmetric information, investor’sinformation asymmetry’s impact on investment efficiency of listed companies mainly causedby the adverse selection problem. Because of the impact of information asymmetry, investorstend to adopt an average evaluation pattern in capital requirements for object choice. From theperspective of moral risk caused by asymmetric information, owner’s information asymmetry’simpact on investment efficiency of listed companies mainly caused by the managers’ moralrisk. The owners in the capital market in our country, supervision is not strong, the managerdefault risk is low, the manager will make the efficiency of investment decision for a variety ofmotives.In order to provide empirical support of the above theoretical analysis, we analysis thefinancial data of listed companies in China by using multiple linear regression empiricallyanalyses the adverse selection and moral hazard of two kinds of asymmetric informationimpact on investment efficiency behavior of listed company of our country’s mechanism. Theempirical model shows that in the two aspects of overinvestment and underinvestment, annualturnover in the listed company stock indirectly measure the degree of information asymmetry,to the enterprise investment behavior exist significant impact on the efficiency, and verify thequality of accounting information quality will lower the inefficient investment behavior of theenterprise. From adverse selection perspective, in the path, the impact of financing constraintsplays a major role. At the same time, from the perspective of moral hazard, the influence ofagency problem plays a major role. Characteristics such as debt levels, also indirectly reflectthe influence of asymmetric information on the enterprise investment efficiency in the process.Regression results show that the effect on the impact of asymmetric information on investment efficiency path, financing constraints and agency problem plays a leading role in the influence,and the quality of accounting information will help ease the information asymmetry on theinvestment efficiency of inhibition.Based on the information asymmetry caused by the adverse selection and moral hazardanalysis of the two perspectives of asymmetric information is verified the effect of investmentefficiency, verify the effect of the regulation of accounting information quality. Put forward tobuild is advantageous to the protection of rights and interests of small and medium-sizedinvestors, boost the stock market information screening and transfer effect of the institutionalenvironment, is to make China’s stock market to the origin of value investment return, improvecapital efficiency of the critical path.