Risk Assessment And Dynamic Game Analysis On The Pattern Of Inventory Financing

With the widespread of market competition and development of industrialeconomy, the competition between modern enterprises is in fact the competitionbetween supply chains. A majority of problems such as the shortage of cash flow andfinancing difficulty have been troubling many middle and small-sized enterprisessince the year2008, which in the meanwhile also affects the development of relatedsupply chains. In recently years, inventory financing, as an innovative financialinstrument, has developed rapidly in our country. This of course to some extent helpsus solve the problem caused by the occupation of a large amount of circulating fund.The pattern of Inventory financing coordinates the benefits between core enterprise,bank and middle and small-sized enterprises effectively. At the same time, the storageenterprise also profits a lot in the participation of cargo storage business.This article mainly discusses two corn points of inventory financing patterns.That is the credit risk assessment in middle and small-sized enterprises and theanalysis of dynamic game about tripartite optimal decision. Firstly, the credit riskassessment in middle and small-sized enterprises under the pattern of inventoryfinancing has changed a lot compared with the traditional assessment patterns. Inaddition to analyzing their own business risks of the middle and small-sizedenterprises, I shall also analyze the risks of other aspects such as supply chains.Besides, I will also assess the default rate in middle and small-sized enterprises withthe help of Logistic model. By empirical analysis，I verify this risk assessment modeland calculate the default rate through using SPSS software. Then, under thecircumstance that the default rate in middle and small-sized enterprises has beendecided, if the quantity demand is the Continuous random variable, three sides makedecisions according to the precedence order. The core enterprise will make counterpurchase policy in support of inventory financing. The bank will make sure the pledgerate on the basis of it. And the middle and small-sized enterprises will confirm whichis the best way to order goods with the help of both the corn enterprise and the bank. In this way, the dynamic game of the three sides has formed.I find out the optimaldecision of the subgame perfect equilibrium mainly through backward induction.Finally, by the means of analog simulation,I will make analysis of examples to thedynamic game model by Mathematica. If the demands were under uniformdistribution, then I would analyze the relation between the repurchase price, impawnrate and order quantity as well as the optimal decision of the three sides.