A Study On The Collusion Behavior In Inquiry System And IPO Pricing Efficiency

During the 20 more years after the birth of China’s stock market, the issue auditing system in China transformed from the administrative approval system to the approval system, continuously moving forward on the road of marketization. China has adopted 44 kinds of IPO pricing ways from 1990 to 2008, and the inquiry system is an important part of the stock issue pricing mode in China’s stock issuing system. However, in the process of the implementation of inquiry system, "three highs” phenomenon and IPO underpricing phenomenon coexist, and in the process of inquiry system reforms, release failure and fraud cases are also become common occurrence.Based on the literature review of collusion behavior and the IPO pricing efficiency, the paper makes the corresponding theory and realistic analysis of the collusion behavior. And the paper points out that the inquiry system cannot avoid the contradiction of marketing issuing and the imperfect issuing system itself. Non-effective supply of the stocks is the root factor to the collusion behavior. And from the perspective of the game analysis of the collusion behavior of the inquiry participants, this paper points out that the unsound information disclosure system is also an important reason for the collusion behavior. This paper conducts theory and empirical tests aiming at the problem of the collusion behavior in inquiry system and IPO pricing efficiency, and the problem is proved from the empirical angle.This paper points out that the collusion behavior in the inquiry system is one of the key factors which influence IPO pricing efficiency. And aiming at the problem, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: Firstly, improving the information disclosure system to truly protect the interests of investors; secondly, establishing the underwriter reputation ranking system to establish the incentive mechanism of high reputation underwriters; thirdly, cutting off the chain of interests and strengthening the responsibility of the inquiry participants; fourthly, reforming the stock issuing system radically.