Research On Information Disclosure Management Of Equity Incentive Of Keda Clean Energy Company

With the implementation of "The measures for the administration of equity incentive of the listing Corporation" from 2006,but problem comes with the rapid development of the system.the original intention to implement equity incentive is balance the interests between managers and owners through giving some options to executives,and improve the performance of the company and retain talent.However,imperfect market supervision,deformity manager market and even the game between the various stakeholders within the enterprise makes the equity incentive system lost its effect,and become executive’s tool to seek interests.This thesis selects stock option equity incentive model,which has the largest proportion of incentive model,from the disclosure of information of three important points of stock option incentive in the draft,before and after the exercise:Announcement on the lifting of the ban, the thesis research the management before and after the disclosure of information management,and the excess rate of return(AR value),cumulative abnormal return rate(CAR value) of the fluctuation trend.In this paper,through analysis Coda’s implementation of incentive stock options, it found Coda has timing behavior in the process of implementation of incentive stock options on disclosure of sensitive information.For example,in the draft release date, delayed good news,even publish bad news to lower stock prices,in order to let the stock be bought at a higher price;release the good news to lift the stock price before the disposal day,target at a higher price for disposal of stock,so that the incentive target can benefit from the deal.Keda’s AR and CAR values were also not regular at each time point:in the draft released and the exercise day,CAR value has obviously downward fluctuation trend, and in the disposal day, there has upward trend of fluctuation.Based on these suspicious factors,The Keda has significantly information disclosure management behavior in the implementation of incentive stock options,these acts not only make great interests for the incentive object,but also damage the fairness of the stock market.The reason of the frequent disclosure of information management in the process of stock option in our country,may related to the internal governance mechanism and the manager market,the lack of external supervision also included. Therefore,our country should strengthen the construction of the manager market,internal mechanism of corporate governance,and the outside supervision to control the information disclosure management behavior.