Managerial Ownership 、Investor Sentiment And Enterprise Investment

Studies showed that investors’ emotion can influence the investment behavior of the company through different channels. Recently, most scholars comply with the irrational investor and rational manager hypothesis and studied through equity financing channel and rational catering channel. Only few literatures studied through the non-rational investor and irrational manager hypothesis.As a matter of fact, when manager reacted to investor sentiment, the irrational factors of manager undoubtedly impact this process, which is an expression pattern of principal-agent problem. In order to alleviate the agency conflict between shareholders and managers, the managerial ownership incentive appeared. Compared to stock Option Incentive, the managerial ownership system developed more perfect(Until 2012, only more than one hundred listed companies carried out stock Option Incentive system, while thousands of listed companies carried out managerial ownership system). The research data is easier to obtain. Therefore, this article used managerial ownership system as starting point and added the product of managerial ownership ratio and investor sentiment, in order to study whether managerial ownership have expected control effect—the irrational when manager cater to investor sentiment.In this article, we formed an analytical framework that how investor sentiment and managerial ownership acted on company investment behavior. After screened by certain standard, we used companies listed from 2010 to 2012 as sample to empirical test. From the perspective of corporate finance, follow catering channel idea, we studied the investment level of the listed company in our country, the impact to investment efficiency as well as the irrationality that whether managerial ownership can inhibit manager to make investment decision.On the basis of previous study and theoretical analysis, four hypotheses were proposed.Study showed: ① The investment level is positively correlated with investor sentiment; ②managerial ownership incentive can suppress the manager from catering to investor sentiment; ③ The investment efficacy of listed company is significantly correlated withinvestor sentiment; ④ In over-invested listed company, managerial ownership will suppress the manager from catering to investor sentiment, which shows that shareholding have positive control effect during over-investment. In under-invested listed company,managerial ownership incentive won’t stimulates but suppress the manager from catering to investor sentiment, which shows that shareholding have negative control effect during under-investment.