Design Of Contract For Tour-guide Service Outsourcing Under Cooperation Service Perspective

With the acceleration of economic development and information process, travel service industry is facing unprecedented opportunities and challenges. As promulgating of new "tourism law", travel agency is gradually outsourcing the business of tour-guide service to professional tour-guide service supplier, in order to enhance the core competitiveness and meet the needs of tourists for high quality of tour-guide service. As the tour-guide service supplier is the hub connecting travel agency and tourists, so designing effective outsourcing contract with characteristics of tour-guide service has an important practical significance on incentive tour-guide service supplier. On the other hand, As travel agency’s participation plays an important role on success of the project of tour-guide service outsourcing. Therefore, this article is establishing contract model with considering the cooperative service relationship between travel agency and tour-guide service supplier. In view of above,with using principal-agent theory, outsourcing contract theory as theoretical basis, the cooperative service contract models of tour-guide service outsourcing under a single principal-agent, multi-agents competition and duel principal-agent relationship are designed. With analyzing these models with different principal-agent relationships, the cooperation contracts designing for tour-guide service outsourcing of this paper can be regarded as the study of systematic and innovative.Firstly, the research background of guide-service outsourcing is introduced, and then we make a systemic analysis and review on service outsourcing, tourism service outsourcing and principal-agent theory and their research present situation. On this basis, with considering the relationship of principal-agent and cooperative service between a travelagency and a tour-guide service provider, the cooperative service contract of tour-guide service outsourcing is designing under travel agency’s participation. We explore the related factors influencing of the cooperative service contract parameters of tour-guide service outsourcing under single principal-agent relationship.Secondly, with considering the problem of outsourcing contract design based on the game between a travel agency and two tour-guide service suppliers, this paper analyzes the competitive relationship between tour-guide service suppliers for tour-guide service outsourcing implementation impact. The results show the competition relationship can make tour-guide service suppliers monitor each other, reduce effectively agency costs, can avoid travel agency relying on a single tour-guide service supplier and the pressure from a huge amount of tourists of tourist season.Then, with considering the double principal-agent identity of travel agency, the cooperation service contract model of tour-guide service outsourcing based on double principal-agent relationship between travel agency and a tour-guide service supplier is built. And the reward-penalty mechanism is added to the model. We discuss the outsourcing contract combining performance sharing mechanism with reward-penalty mechanism can effectively improve tourists’ utility. In addition, this article also considers the rationalization to set performance sharing mechanism and reward-penalty mechanism is very important for travel agency when choosing the tour-guide service outsourcing strategy.Finally, the summary and future research of this paper is provided.