Empirical Study On Correlation Managerial Power Between Executive Compensation Of The Listed Companies In Chinese Financial Industry

In 2007, the outbreak of the subprime crisis spread to all walks of life, intensified, and the global financial crisis, the crisis revealed many problems make people ponder. Such as imperfect corporate governance, business risk, regulation is not in place. In this crisis, Wall Street financial firms are facing huge losses or even bankruptcy, but frequently to expose financial bosses take a huge pay scandal. Wall Street financial institutions from the United States of bonuses to merrill lynch and lehman brothers’ golden parachute phenomenon, to China’s ping an insurance, chairman of Mr Ma salary of more than 60 million and the following year events such as "zero compensation", the financial industry "sky-high compensation" phenomenon at the same time the attention of social public and the scholars. The federal reserve to supervise financial industry executive pay, if it is found that compensation lead to excessive pursuit of risky business, the fed has the right to interfere. There is a huge compensation in China’s financial industry has been "great gap", "executive dry day, employees do three months" wait for a phenomenon, in recent years both work report "the disparity of income distribution and balance" has always been the hot spot of the discussion.In this paper, based on the background of "salary limit at home and abroad, from the management of the emerging power theory, the selection of Shanghai and Shenzhen two strands of 38 in 2006-2013 financial data regression analysis of listed companies, listed companies of China’s financial industry by the research of the relationship between the executive power and executive pay and inspection on-the-job consumption is executive pay money substitutes or complements. Finally, in the inspection of pay, based on the economic effect of specific guidance. In this paper, the main contents are the following several parts:The first part is the introduction. First the purpose and the significance of this study, by analyzing the research status at home and abroad, provides the logical architecture, summarize and extract the full text research contents and research methods, finally pointed out in this paper, research and innovation and deficiency.The second part is the related concepts and basic theory. Relating to a systematic comprehensive expounded in this paper, the related concepts and important theory, provides a theoretical basis for the subsequent research.The third part is the analysis about the present situation of financial executive compensation of listed companies in our country. First use of excel spreadsheet, making all kinds of charts, tables, secondly through comparative study on the table and figure pay structures at home and abroad, in the end, according to research found that domestic compensation structure is not reasonable of explanation is put forward.The fourth part is the empirical test. This article selects 2006-2013, the Shanghai and Shenzhen two city financial listed companies as research samples, through the selected sample data and measure, build multivariate linear regression model. Using the SPSS and EVIEWS software on executive power to empirically test the influence of executive compensation, and the test results are summarized.The fifth part conclusion. In this paper, based on the theoretical and empirical research results summarized in this paper, the research conclusion, and put forward some reasonable Suggestions combined with the actual problem, and proposes the outlook for the future research.In this paper, we study the following conclusions:(1) using the management power is not only for executive dominant influence monetary compensation, stealth on-the-job consumption, also the pay gap between executives and ordinary workers have a significant impact. (2) the dominant currency substitution relationship between compensation and invisible on-the-job consumption are. Under the condition of strict compensation control, dominant monetary compensation is strictly regulated, invisible remuneration as executives instead of compensation. (3) management performance to make use of power interference, monetary compensation and performance of executives that resulted from that change with asymmetrical relationship. The performance rises above the performance pay is reduced to reduce compensation. (4) pay for implementation of executives seeking monetary compensation and on-the-job consumption, as well as to narrow the gap in pay, etc, have certain inhibitory effect.