Research On Equity Incentive System Design And The Synergistic Effect Based On Listed Companies

As an important way of long-term incentive, equity incentive system has played a positive effect on the reduce principal-agent cost and improve enterprise performance, this has been confirmed in the foreign practice. In the 1990 s, in order to solve the problems arising from the principal-agent, our country enterprise began to introduce equity incentive mechanism.With the constant improvement of China’s capital market, more and more companies adopt equity incentive system. Therefore, in the current economic environment in our country, what important influencing factors which equity incentive system design involves in? The implementation of equity incentive system of listed companies need combined with the actual situation of enterprises, in order to maximum exerts its incentive effects? Whether and how the company supervision and restraint mechanism for its influential role? How to improve the design of equity incentive system? How to improve the internal supervision mechanism and external environment, in order to make the equity incentive system and internal supervision mechanism and enterprise external environment to achieve dynamic synergy? The study of these problems is significant.According to the above problem, this paper studies mainly including theory review, the implementation of equity incentive system and equity incentive system design and the synergistic effect of empirical. First of all, this paper reviews the study of the equity incentive system implementation effect, synergies and equity incentive and the synergistic effect in the view of the domestic and foreign scholars. Secondly, with stakeholders, principal-agent, incentive mechanism, human capital, corporate governance and coordination theory as the foundation, equity incentive system design were discussed from the theoretical level and the synergistic effect. Finally, based on the actual situation of Chinese listed companies, analysis our country listed company equity incentive system design and the synergistic effect, and put forward some improvement suggestions.This paper selects the implementation of equity incentive system of 2006-2011 in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as samples. This paper research the effect on the implementation of equity incentive from the correlation of equity incentive system and corporate performance. This paper selects four major elements of the contract:the level of incentive, incentive model, vesting conditions and the expiration date. The empirical results show that:the higher the excitation level, the more stringent conditions for the exercise, the better business performance. It also found that the use of restricted stock better than stock options. In addition, the description of the validity of the design elements of our system is not very serious.Then, starting with within the company supervision and restraint mechanism and the external environment, this paper introduce the theoretical synergies and build synergy targets, and explore synergies between equity incentive and corporate supervision and restraint mechanisms. The empirical results show that:ownership concentration, served as chairman of the board and general manager, and the equity incentive and restraint mechanisms have negative synergistic effect on the performance of listed companies in the process. The top three directors’remuneration, the level of market and business environment, equity incentive and restraint mechanisms have positive synergistic effect on the performance of listed companies functioning. The proportion of independent directors in the performance of the listed company equity incentive system did not play its proper role in the process.According to the above findings, this paper designs equity incentive system to fit our country, to improve the company’s internal supervision and restraint mechanisms and establish a favorable external environment, and put forward feasible suggestions to the company and the relevant regulatory authorities.