An Empirical Study On The Effect Of Investor Relations Management Of The Two Types Of Agency Costs

In the background of the completion of the split share structure reform, construction of thelaws and regulations, the investor relationship management has gained more and moreattention, and has great practical significance to study the relationship between investors andmanagement. Investor relations management refers to the company through more disclosureto the outside world, more communicate with investors, so that the external investors knowmore about the company, the company can better corporate governance, which can achievethe dual purpose of the value of maximization and to protect the interests of investors,. In theorganization of the separation of ownership and management of the company, the company inits place and not for its phenomenon, caused damage to the interests of the shareholders, howto reduce the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers is the focal point ofacademic research. Our country at present medium and small investors without discourse right,Large Share holders Expropriation of minority shareholders seriously, on the level of investorrelations management influence on the agency cost between large shareholders and smallshareholders is particularly important.According to the experience of previous studies, the agency cost is divided into twocategories: one category is the agency costs between shareholders and managers,managementfee rate to measure, we call the first type agency cost; one is the agency cost between thecontrolling shareholders and small shareholders, with the degree of separation of two rights ofcontrolling shareholders is control rights and cash flow rights to measure the difference,known as the second kind of agency cost. Listed on the main board based on2010-2012forthree consecutive years, the Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchangecompanies for the study sample, using empirical and normative research methods combined tostudy the impact of investor relationship management of the two types of agency costs.Firstly, on the basis of previous studies, explores the significance and practical researchon basic theory of investor relations management, laying a solid foundation for the followingresearch; then in the ninth, eighth and seventh new wealth gold secretary of the board ofdirectors selection results as the level of investor relations management of the substitutevariables of this empirical study the3264listing Corporation, selected in line with theconditions of the statistical analysis, the empirical results show that: the agency cost betweenthe investor relations management and corporate shareholders and managers that show a significant negative correlation between the first type agency cost; show a significant negativecorrelation between the agency costs between investor relationship management andcorporate shareholders and minority shareholders is the second kind of agency cost.In order toimprove the reliability we have the robust test, alternative variable of the first type agencycost of replacement assets turnover, the regression results with the former but not through thesignificant test; instead of second kind of agency cost variable replacement for otherreceivables to total assets ratio, regression analysis results coincides with the front andthrough a significant test. Finally, this paper is divided into three aspects of the developmentof investor relations management suggestions on China: perfect laws and regulations,supervise the listing Corporation to carry out the management of investor relations, the CSRCand the relevant governmental investor relations management to strengthen supervision oninvestor relations management. and the relevant governmental investor relations managementto strengthen supervision on investor relations management.