| Shanghai In the face of the financing difficulties of small andmedium-sized enterprises, fierce competition between banks and industrybottlenecks of third party logistics enterprises, inventory financing arises atthe historic moment. Inventory financing transfers most of the credit risk ofenterprises to the market risk of the pledge, which makes it easier for banksto control the risk. It not only eases the financing difficulties of small andmedium enterprises, but also increases the banks and third party logisticsenterprises’profit space.Currently most of the inventory financing research focuses on businessmodel innovation and risk analysis. The quantitative study of the keyindicators is relatively less, and they only consider the fluctuation of pledgedemand or pledge price. This paper considers the fluctuation of pledgedemand and price at the same time and use Stackelberg game model to studythe decision problem of borrowing enterprises, banks and logisticsenterprises. Firstly, this paper combed the evolution of inventory financingboth at home and abroad and its risk analysis. Then we set up the final cashflow model for borrowing enterprises and the profit model both for banksand logistics enterprises. We then use backward induction method to solvethe optimal amount of pledge for borrowing enterprises and the optimalloan-to-value ratio for banks that are using underside risk control method.Finally, this paper use numerical simulation to study the optimal decisionsof borrowing enterprises and banks, and we also study their decisions interms of different financing periods, loan interest rates and enterprise creditrisk. |
