Residual Control Rights Allocation Of Public-private-partnership Project Based On Two-tuple Linguisti

Public-Private-Partnership is an important model within which public sectorscooperate with private sectors to produce and provide public goods or service. It helpsalleviate the public sector’s problem of lack of money, take advantages of privatesectors in capital, technologies and efficient allocation of sources. However, in factthe benefits and effects of PPP projects are often not achieved as expected, along withthe problems of underinvestment and “hold-up” arising, which in result seriouslyadversely affect the efficiency of the PPP projects. Researches find that the root causeof all these is the incompleteness of PPP contract, and the key point of improving thecompleteness of PPP contract lies on better allocation of residual control rights. Thethesis is based on the perspective of incomplete contract, combs the related theoriesand control rights allocation models through literature and model analysis. Throughextracting from the models of GHM, HSV, BG and FM the factors which should beconsidered when allocating control rights and making analysis on the external factorsof PPP residual control rights allocation, this paper proposes the comprehensiveevaluation index system for PPP residual control rights allocation and develops amodel of PPP project residual control rights allocation based on two-tuple linguistic.In the end, the feasibility of the model is verified by the example of Beijing NationalStadium, which makes analysis on the residual control rights allocation on thecancellation of the removable roof. The research in this paper illustrates that there arethree internal factors of PPP control residual rights allocation, which include theimportance of investment, the types of the parties’ gains, the evaluation level of theproduct value and the publicity of the product, and four external factors, which aretechnical capacity, financial capacity, management capacity and resource capacity.Through the analysis based on PPP residual control rights allocation model, theresidual control rights of removable roof change should belong to private sector, butin fact it was controlled by government, which led to the difficulty of construction andoperation, and showed the problem that government has the initiative in the PPPresidual control rights allocation.