With the rapid development of Chinese economic, the demand of resource products is increasing as well, like oil and iron ore. A large number of demands can be satisfied by importing. Although, there are a few of resource products of which the storage volume in China is ranked at the top in the world, such as rare earth. Just because of that, China is always in the state of exporting in those products. In recent years, as the decreasing of yields of strategic resources in other countries, the prices of those products are rocketing. In this phenomenon, the yields of resource products in China are soaring. For example, the yields of rare earth in China occupied above95%of the total yields in the world. It is true that the export of resource products drives the development of economic. However, the unreasonable exploring damages the environment of producing area. Meanwhile, the Chinese government is gradually aware of the importance of resource products in the sustainable development and the safety of political and military affairs. Base on such awareness, the government takes all kinds of laws and regulations to restrain the yields of resource products, such as export quotas and export tariff for those products. Those measurements restrict the yield and protect the environment and resource in some degree. But some countries in Europe and America appeal to the WTO. Because they think that the measurement taken by China violates their profits. The complaint between the WTO members is solved by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The dynamic game theory can analyze the dispute settlement mechanism. Simultaneously, combing the dispute settlement mechanism, the dynamic game theory is able to analyze China’s export restrictions on resource management. Many scholars explain China’s such management by pure theory. This paper tries to study China’s export restrictions by case study and puts forwards some suggestions. In the cases about China’s export restrictions, the case of China’s export restrictions on raw materials and the case of China’s export restrictions on rare earth are classic. So, this paper takes those two cases as the objects of case study.On the base of describing the situation of China’s resource products export restriction, this paper use the dynamic game to research the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and calculate the optimal strategy solution and the behaviors choice in the different situations. Following that, the author assesses whether China’s behaviors are reasonable or not in those two cases.Through the analyzing, several conclusions are got. Firstly, in general, the dispute settlement mechanism ends in the implementation stage. The reason is that the cost of implementing the decision is much lower than that of non-implementing. Secondly, there are some dominant equilibriums existing in the dispute settlement mechanism. Thirdly, China’s behaviors are reasonable in the case of the raw material export restrictions, but some shortcomings exist. But in the case of rare earth export restrictions those disadvantages are overcome.Combing those conclusions, some suggestions are provided for the management of the export restrictions in China. Firstly, the government should take advantage of the dispute settlement mechanism in the complaint, such as paying much attention to the consultation and seizing the initiative. And the government should strengthen the skill of dealing with the WTO conflictions. Secondly, the government should modify the relative domestic laws that violating the WTO regulations.The main contribution of this paper contents two aspects. Firstly, in the researching method, the dynamic game theory is used to analyzing the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Meanwhile, the China’s resource products export restrictions is studied by the case study. Secondly, this paper researching the behavior choices in the dispute settlement mechanism, rather than the WTO regulations. In the same time, due to the limitation of researching skills, some shortcomings exist. Firstly, the dynamic game model doesn’t consider the political factor. Secondly, this model doesn’t consider the domestic relevant industries’ behaviors. Thirdly, without the data of the cases, the precision is little poorer. In the future research, we hope those shortcoming solved and the related scholars can criticize and carrv out some advices. |