| Managerial ownership incentives for managers in the, foreign enterprise applications more widespread, but is not yet common in our country. In order to maintain the consistency of the executives and shareholders’ equity, reduce agency costs, and achieve the purpose of long-term incentive, managerial ownership is an imperative of effective measures.This paper by collating related literature at home and abroad, the research achievements in the field of panoramic comb, comparing various scholars differences and analyze the reason of study; Secondly, the classic principal-agent theory, human capital theory, signal theory, combined with the paper topic, trying to explain theoretically the necessity of management equity and reason, and from the point of view of theoretical analysis of the possible relationship between management ownership and corporate performance and form. Once again, from the Angle of empirical management equity status of listed companies from2006to2012were analyzed; Finally, from the Shanghai and shenzhen two city finally choose168implemented A management system of ownership of a-share listed companies as samples, design the regression equation of the relationship between management ownership and corporate performance empirical test, at the same time design equation inspection state holding listed companies and the non-state-owned holding the management equity of listed companies and the relationship between the corporate performance statistically significant difference.Regression analysis results show that with the help of control variables, the our country listed company management ownership is negatively related to the value of the company, the equity incentive mechanism in our country are not fully play its proper incentive effect. In addition, the test results confirm management ownership and corporate performance is not a simple linear relationship between, that within a certain range, the management equity incentive effect, while more than a certain range to negative effect. In addition, the management ownership of state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned holding the influence degree of the larger.To promote the role of managerial ownership results are not very significant, and therefore the management of such holdings in foreign countries as an effective incentive mechanism, and no more did not play a full role in our current majority of listed companies. Retroactive reason may be that equity incentives applied in the history of our business is still shallow, many companies have not established a comprehensive set of equity incentives, and even many listed companies is still in the exploratory stage. Many of our companies less emphasis on equity incentives, incentives for management’s main cash reward or other material incentives, thus resulting in the listing of the Company’s management currently lower proportion of ownership, or even not enough to play its due role. |
