| Since2002, disputes over the exchange rate determination of RMB between China and America has been a central issue in Sino-US bilateral relations. This dissertation is trying to research the issue with the two-level games theory under the condition of incomplete information, trough the perspective of interactivity between domestic and international level, as well as between politics and economics.The exchange rate of a country refers to the price of foreign currency, measured by domestic currency. The devaluation of domestic currency will lead to negative externality, which tend to be overproduced without central authority or equilibrium. Thus, international cooperation, not domestic requirements, is the answer to eliminate the externality and determine exchange rate of a country. The possibility is determined by the size of win-sets, which is affected by interests, institution, conception and information through different approach, under the theory of two-level games International cooperation is depended on not only the process of domestic politics, but also the strategic interactivity between negotiators in international level. Games and interactivity between actors is not depended on their interests, but recognition to interests, according to bounded rationality. Actors calculate their interests based on information, which is disproportionately distributed to them. Conception and belief are important since they affect actors’ability to calculate. Power structure and domestic institution determine the interests of actors, as well as formation of conception and spread of information, and consequently affect actors’recognition of interests. Negotiators bridge domestic level to international level, as well as play games simultaneously in the two level. Thus, the negotiators’strategy also determines the size of win-sets.The boom of China’s economy in the past thirty years is a part of post-war "East Asian Miracles". China also has a guiding government, as well as other east-Asian miracle countries, which played an important part in the economic boost in the area. Some characteristics of guiding governments have impacts on actors’recognition and expression of interests during the process of international cooperation, and then impact the size of win-sets. On the other hands, guiding governments possess more abilities to utilize bargain strategies, and thus also affect the size of win-sets.This research is beneficial to understand the extent, pattern and future direction of Sino-US disputes over the issue of exchange rate determination of RMB. Essentially, The disputes is a kind of international cooperation to resolve and eliminate the negative externality of RMB. In the democratic America, relationship between domestic political actors and social actors is assumed to principal-agent model, the core social actors related to the issue, such as manufacturers and labors, have strong links to the White House and the Congress, through political expression and information purveyance. And consequently affect the preference of political actors. The bill in the congress is the basis of American domestic win-sets, but the president is able to veto the bill. The Chinese government is a typical guiding government, political actors’preference take the main proportion of preference structure. The basis of Chinese win-sets is the exchange rate determination is consistent to the structure of economy. The reform of exchange rate determination of RMB is only one step of the effort to deepen the overall reform and adjust the economic structure. Besides, the ability of utilization the combination of strategies is different between China and the US, since the Chinese guiding government has much more abilities to realize side-payments and topic-linking strategy, which bring bargaining advantages in return. |
