The Research On Evolutionary Equilibrium Of Agriculture Product Green Supply Chain Driven By Government Policy

With the development of economy, the requirements of people’s life qualitybecome higher, but the qua lity sa fety proble ms o f agric ultura l product frequentlythreaten people’s healthy life. Now green and pollution-free have become thema instream of develop ment direction of agric ultura l products, how to make theenterprise carry out the green inno vatio n for the traditiona l agric ultura l productssupply cha in, strengthen the environmental protectio n conscio usness, ma ximize theresource utilization e fficie ncy, guarantee the qua lity and safety o f agricultura lproducts has beco me the worth studying proble m. The paper uses evo lutio nary ga meto study the influence of government’s rewards, punishments and inspection on thedegree of green agric ultural products supply c hain, in order to improve the study o fgreen agric ultural products supply cha in, to provide the reference for the governme ntto promote its develop ment.The artic le firstly research on the optima l green investment strategy of farmersorganizatio n and agricultura l products processing enterprises in the AgricultureProduct Supply Cha in. Establis h demand functio n based on different consumerpreference of agriculture product’s green degree, at the same time the agricultureproduct supply chain’s degree reflect their cost and benefit.Construct theevolutionary game model of farmer organizatio ns and agricultura l productsprocess ing enterprises based on evolutionary game theory. The paper proved that the irchoice of green investme nt exists hitc hing pheno meno n and in the short time can notmake agricultural product to develop to increase it’s green degree. The governmentshould give appropriate subsidies to increase the agriculture product’s green degree.Secondly research on the optima l strategy cho ice of the government and the coreenterprise of agricultura l products supply cha in that have the effect of loss aversion.Using the loss averse model to show the utility functio n of the core enterprise.Research the steady state under different initial cond itions by e volutionary ga me. Theresearch shows that: the green supp ly c hain mana ge ment cost, green revenue, the lossaversion coeffic ie nt of the core enterprise and the fines, green s ubsid y of governme ntcan a ffect the final steady state, the governme nt must regulate and control the marketdepend on different s ituatio ns for the benign deve lopme nt of green agricult ura lproducts supply cha in. All in all, the paper puts forward the evo lutio nary ga me mode l of greenagric ultural products supply cha in under the condition of government interve ntion,study the cooperative game re lationship of the supply chain, the influenc e ofgovernme nt incentives and check for the deve lopme nt of green agriculture supplychain and puts forward the correspond ing polic y reco mmendations, it has a certainguid ing s ignifica nce of the benign deve lopme nt of green agric ultural products.