| Inefficient investment has always been a major problem in the listed enterprises,and the quality of corporate investment decisions will directly affect the efficiency ofcorporate governance and business operations, also it has a great impact on enterpriseperformance and business growth. With the economical integration and globalization,cross-listing has become the choice of more and more companies. Faced stringentaccounting standards and regulatory systems of the overseas capital market,cross-listing companies can give more protection for investors, and optimize theexternal environment and internal governance. Act as an effective way to influencecorporate governance and governance environment, can it affect investment decisions,then inhibit inefficient investment?For solving the question, taking as the specimens listed A+H share firms in Chinafrom2008to2012, this paper develops a framework that focus on the relationshipbetween cross-listing and corporate governance, and basis on AsymmetricInformation theory, Principal-agent Theory, Transaction Cost Theory and corporategovernance theory, gives a theoretical analysis and empirical test on the correlationbetween the cross-listing and inefficient investment management.The research result of this paper shows that, cross-listing has the effect ofinefficient investment management. Through the improvement of the externalgovernance and corporate governance of the listed companies, it can help listedcompanies improve the over-investment and under-investment problem. Moreover, wefound that the shares of listed companies and the nature of ownership concentrationhas an important impact on the treatment effect of cross-listing, and compared withthe state-owned compared enterprise, cross-listing effects on non-state-ownedenterprises is better; compared with the relative holding state-owned enterprises,absolute holding state-owned enterprises has a more significant effect. |
