Study Of Independent Director System On Related Transaction Restrictive Effect

Related transaction mainly refers to transfer of resources or business matters in between the related party, and no matter how the price. Because of the characteristic of the hidden nature of related party transaction, in general, it is difficult to find its unfair quality when listed company uses this for Profit-shifting or tax-evasion. To some extent, Manipulation of unfair trade practices has seriously damaged the legitimate interests of minority shareholders. With the market economy system, due to its own characteristics and objective reality, so the related party transactions can not be prevented. For the protection of the rights of minority shareholders, only we can do is just improving the information disclosure mechanism about the related party transactions and restrict the behavior of listed companies when related party transactions occurred.In order to maintain the integrity of the overall interests of listed companies, in order to protect the legitimate interests of minority shareholders, in order to regulate the behavior of related party transactions of listed companies, China Securities Regulatory Commission specially enforce carry on an independent directors system from abroad in listed companies. Expectations of the independent directors system properly regulate and guide the behavior of related party transactions of listed companies. And so far, more than ten years the independent directors system carry on listed companies, what about of the implement result of this system in China? Theorists and practitioners have started to pay attention on this problem.This paper argues that, with the improvement of the independent directors system and the richness of the implementation experience, the independent directors system in China’s listed companies will be play a positive role in company’s operation. And the effect of the constraints associated with the transaction will be effectively guaranteed. On the basis of the existing research achievement, for the protection of small shareholders, selecting the companies with A-shares as the sample, in this paper us empirical analysis the effect of independent directors system in China constraints on the related party transactions. The conclusion is, because of the number of independent director and the salary system, the independent director system did not have independence feature. But in recent years China, the ownership structure of listed companies still keeps only one big share, is not conducive to the independent director system of listed company function. At last, at the end of this article some related suggestions were put forward.