With wireless sensor networks’application in military and other data-sensitive fields, their security becomes a hot topic. The study of wormhole attacks detection is a key field in the research of the security of WSN. At present, it is meaningful in theory and practice to design an wormhole attacks detection scheme that could fit the features of WSN. This thesis introduces wireless sensor network security situation and safe hidden trouble, analyzed the wormhole against principle and currently popular research defenses.This thesis focuses on wormhole attacks detection in wireless sensor networks. The wormhole attack is particularly challenging to deal with since the adversary does not need to compromise any nodes and can use lap tops or other wireless devices to send the packets on a low latency channel. We propose a novel algorithm for detecting wormhole attacks in wireless multi-hop networks. The algorithm uses only connectivity information to look for forbidden substructures in the connectivity graph and the evidence that no attack is taking place by checking the path existence in current state. The proposed approach is completely localized and, unlike many techniques proposed in literature, does not use any special hardware artifact or location information, making the technique universally applicable. We present simulation results to show that the algorithm is able to detect wormhole attacks with a almost100%detection and nearly0%false alarm probabilities whenever the network is connected with high probability or not. The algorithm can always prevent wormholes, irrespective of the density of the network, while its effciency is not afected even by frequent connectivity changes. We also provide an analytical evaluation of the algorithm’s correctness along with an implementation on real sensor devices that demonstrates its effciency in terms of memory requirements and processing overhead. |