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Research On The System Of Housing Expropriation And Compensation On State Owned Land

Posted on:2016-01-17Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y J GengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2296330482964943Subject:Market economy law
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
China has entered the stage of rapid development, urban renewal, has brought the increase of urban state-owned land on the housing levy. However, the order of the housing levy has not been optimistic, resulting in a lot of reasons for this situation, but the legal system of defects, is one of the important reasons. Lack of regulatory system, provides the opportunity to impose a tax levied on the interests of the family, and ultimately causing a dispute, and even the occurrence of malignant events.January 21,2011, "the state owned land on the housing levy and Compensation Ordinance" (hereinafter referred to as the 2011 "Regulations"), which has been the third changes in the urban housing system, but the practice shows that it still can not play its due role. Therefore, the research of this system is still needed. The theory of institutional change provides a kind of research method, using this theory to study the changes of the housing levy system, which can explore the inherent law of the system changes. The path dependence theory of institutional change is the role of the existing system. With the theory, it can be found that China’s urban housing levy system in the process of transition in the use right of independence consciousness rigid, harbor government staff violations, escape compensation information disclosure, compensation mode innovation stagnation and public participation system in the form of five atresia path, this is our current system existing problem is our country housing levy system has been slow to effectively improve the crux of the problem where. The defects of the system, resulting in the game between the local government and the local government into a stalemate. Housing levy of the smooth progress, can not be separated from the support of the family. And whether to obtain support, the key lies in the reasonable or not the local government expropriation behavior. How to design the house expropriation laws and regulations, so that the local government behavior to get the correct guidance, and to win the cooperation of the family, is the key to break the deadlock. The evolutionary game model of the local government, as well as the establishment and analysis of the dynamic game model between the local government and the local government, provides a reasonable way of designing the system. On this basis, the system is perfect, can improve the purpose of the housing levy order.Under the following five aspects:first, to improve the compensation range, the land use compensation is included in the compensation range, the maximum maintenance is subject to compensation; two, the government responsibility is to ensure that compensation; five, the government’s responsibility is to ensure that;, the responsibility of the government is to ensure that compensation; four, the government’s responsibility is to ensure that compensation should be. Three. Strengthen the public participation system, so that the collection decision to integrate public opinion, improve the correct rate of decision-making, only a reasonable development and utilization of the housing levy, in order to achieve the maximization of value-added benefits. Under the guidance of the game model, it also breaks the path of the institutional changes. Therefore, the future of the housing levy system will be further improved, China’s state-owned land on the housing levy on the right track.
Keywords/Search Tags:Housing levy and compensation, institutional change, Game theory
PDF Full Text Request
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