| In the face of the borrowers overdue repayment, different online P2 P lending companies make different choices: Honglingchuangtou paid off the overdue by its own fund in accordance with its prior agreement, and this rigid payment greatly attracted popularity; Shengrongzaixian limited cash withdrawal, and hoped resolve its crisis by cooperating with other platform, investors worried about the future of the company; Daibangwang insisted that platform was a mediator between borrowers and investors anddidn’t have the duty to rigid payment. Therefore Daibangwang hoped to resolve the crisis through legal channels. Such kind of approach was called by some people that “short-sighted, not the big picture”.Throughout the current situation of domestic online P2 P lending platform, the rigid payment becomes a common choice of the industry. This approach encourages investors to develop a habit that “only care about platform., not to care the specific borrowing subjects”. Whether the rigid payment can sustainable development? Whether cause the bad money drives out the good money?Because of the financial market doesn’t meet the needs of both parties and the lack of regulation, online P2 P lending developed rapidly in the past few years. The Internet provides a convenient investment channel, but lacking credit evaluation system and serious information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers made investors worried. Under such circumstances,many platforms generated guarantee models. Because various capital participated in this area, online P2 P lending became competitive, so many companies stood out by offering rigid payment. Otherwise,a shrinking share of the market.As the regulatory of online P2 P lending gradually improve, the China Banking Regulatory Commission put forward the regulatory principle“P2P platform can’t offer guarantee”, whether the rigid payment situation be broken?We need specificly make an analysis on different guarantee model. This thesis divided P2 P lending into four models: Self financing model, platform guarantee model, the third party cooperation organization guarantee model and risk reserve guarantee model.This thesis argues that self-financing model shall be prohibited, because this guarantee model is a disguised absorbing public saving behavior, violates the relevant provisions of criminal law. The third party cooperation organization guarantee model should be improved and controlled in a reasonable scale without causing systemic risk. To encourage to establish risk reserve guarantee and control transaction scale, otherwise it is impossible to achieve the true sense of guarantee. Publicly advertising rigid is a ban. Without prior guarantee agreement, platform operators use its own or shareholders’ fund to rigid payment. As a business strategy considerations to maintain its reputation, this model is not prohibited by relevant laws.This thesis contain three chapters.The First chapter briefly introduces the online P2 P lending society background and operation. This chapter compares the different ways to deal with overdue repayment and analyzes the reason rigid payment become a popular choice.The Second chapter introduces Prosper and ZOPA operate model, and analyzes foreign online P2 P lending companies’ institutional advantage. Classifying the different guarantee model and analyzing each transaction structure. This thesis compares native and foreign online P2 P lending, and summarizes the differences of different model, provides useful reference for online P2 P lending.The third chapter evaluates and selects native rigid payment model. Forbid self-financing model and related party guarantee; Encourage information-media model; Separated the third-party guarantee and platform systemic risk; Control risk reserve transaction scale. According to relevant legal provisions and the practice of platforms, provides some suggestions for perfecting online P2 P lending. |
PDF Full Text Request